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ESSAYS ON FRESH VEGETABLE PRODUCTION  
AND MARKETING PRACTICES 
 
Commercial fresh vegetable production is one of the most rewarding and risky farming 
activities. The price and yield variations throughout the production year, the special 
characteristics of fresh vegetable produce (i.e. perishability), and the changing consumer 
demands are some of the factors contributing to the increased uncertainty faced by 
vegetable producers.  
 
This dissertation combined mathematical programming and econometric techniques to: 
1) investigate the optimal production and marketing practices under different price 
distribution information scenarios, risk aversion levels and marketing outlets and  
2) examine growers’ preferences as well the effect of risk aversion levels and 
growers’ risk perception on the choice of marketing contracts.  
 
Specifically, the following three modeling approaches were adopted in order to achieve 
the dissertation objectives:  
1) quadratic programming under a mean-variance framework,  
2) discrete choice experiments and  
3) a combination of quadratic and integer programming embodied in a mean-
variance framework.  
 
The findings indicate that optimal production practices and the resulting net returns are 
substantially influenced not only by the choice of marketing channel but also by growers’ 
risk aversion levels as well as price knowledge. Furthermore, regarding the choice of 
marketing contracts, the results highlight the existence of heterogeneity in preferences 
and illustrate the importance of certification cost, in line with the previous literature. 
Lastly, the findings indicate that risk aversion and risk preferences do not play a 
significant role in the choice of contractual agreements by farmers. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Successful commercial fresh vegetable production is a demanding task that 
requires a combination of production and marketing skills from the grower. This is a 
consequence of the special attributes of fresh produce. For instance, the perishability of 
fresh vegetables leads to fewer storage opportunities compared to other agronomic crops. 
As a result, growers are compelled to accept the market price close to, or during, their 
harvesting period. Furthermore, traditional risk mitigation options (i.e., future markets) 
do not exist for fresh vegetables. Thus, growers are more vulnerable to market 
fluctuations. Finally, growers need to operate in a changing market environment with 
greater demand for more varieties and quality (Dimitri et al., 2003). If the vegetable 
produced does not meet the required standards, then the grower has to sell at a lower 
price or not at all. 
The aforementioned discussion illustrates the importance of selecting the most 
appropriate market outlet. Specifically, “which type(s) of market(s) to enter?” should be 
among the first decisions made by a fresh vegetable grower. Adequate examination of 
this topic requires consideration of several crops (herein tomatoes and sweet corn), 
different markets (herein wholesale or a combination of wholesale and marketing 
contracts), production practices (herein several transplanting/planting and harvesting 
periods), risk aversion levels and the competition for resources across enterprises. 
Despite the extensive research regarding: i) growers’ choices under uncertainty 
and ii) the factors affecting the use and selection of contracts (i.e., age, education, 
income, etc.) the literature sheds little light on: i) the interaction of production and 
marketing practices and how they are influenced by risk aversion and ii) growers’ 
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preferences for contractual agreements. The present dissertation is an effort to help fill 
this gap. 
Specifically, the dissertation has two general objectives. First, it attempts to 
answer the question of optimal marketing outlet and production timing for fresh 
vegetable growers aiming to maximize net returns. Second, it examines how growers’ 
preferences, risk aversion levels and risk preferences affect their marketing choices. Two 
marketing options are examined in this case: 1) wholesale marketing and 2) a 
combination of wholesale and marketing contracts. The former has limited legal 
requirements from the growers. However, the prices offered are lower, compared to other 
options, and vary significantly throughout the production year. Participation in a 
marketing contract, on the other hand, is more demanding from the grower but offers 
more stable prices. 
 In order to achieve these objectives, mathematical programming and econometric 
techniques are employed. The present dissertation follows a three-essay format. Each 
manuscript can be considered as an extension of the previous one with increased 
complexity. Thus, although separate from each other, the three manuscripts are 
complementary. This approach allows the investigation of several aspects of fresh 
vegetable marketing and production practices. Furthermore, it enables comparison of 
results among different scenarios and estimation techniques. A discussion of the three 
manuscripts follows. 
1.1 Chapter Initiatives 
The second chapter has two main objectives. First, it investigates the effect of 
price variability, yield variability and risk aversion on the choice of optimal production 
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timing for wholesale marketing. Second, it examines the impact of price seasonality 
consideration on the optimal production practices and economic outcomes. The focus 
area is Fayette County, Kentucky (KY), one of the top vegetable producing counties in 
the state. Two crops are examined: 1) tomatoes and 2) sweet corn. These two are the top 
vegetables produced in KY both in terms of acres and number of farms. A hypothetical 
five-acre vegetable producer is used as the case study. 
A combination of biophysical simulation and whole farm modeling is used to 
answer the research question. Specifically, a resource allocation mean-variance quadratic 
formulation is employed to examine the role of price, yield variability and growers’ risk 
aversion on optimal production timing. Wholesale marketing is the examined market 
outlet.  
The focus of the third chapter shifts to grower preferences for marketing 
contracts. Discrete choice modeling is employed to answer this research question. The 
main data source is a mail survey administered to 315 wholesale tomato growers in four 
states: 1) Illinois, 2) Indiana, 3) Kentucky and 4) Ohio. The effect of eight contract 
attributes (early price, peak price, late price, early volume requirements, late volume 
requirements, peak volume requirements, penalty, 3rd party safety cost), as well as the 
role of growers’ risk aversion and risk preferences, are examined.  
The fourth chapter provides a synthesis of the previous two under a mathematical 
programming formulation. Specifically, a combination of quadratic and integer 
programming, embodied in a mean-variance framework, is employed to examine the role 
of growers’ risk aversion in the choice of optimal marketing mix. More precisely, 
growers’ preferences between two marketing options (wholesale marketing versus a 
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combination of wholesale marketing and marketing contracts) under ten risk aversion 
levels are examined. Additionally, alterations in production practices required under the 
different market outlets and risk aversion levels are examined. 
The final chapter of the dissertation provides a summary and discussion of the 
findings and methods used. Furthermore, the chapter discusses areas for future research.  
  
Copyright © Michael Vassalos 2013 
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Chapter 2: Optimal Land Allocation and Production Timing for Fresh Vegetable 
Growers under Price and Production Uncertainty 
2.1 Introduction 
Growers’ decisions (i.e. choice of inputs, land allocation, production mix, etc.) in 
the uncertain environment created by production and price variability are a subject that 
has attracted scholars for more than five decades. Mapp et al. (1979) and Babcock et al. 
(1987) provide a discussion and review of the early research endeavors in this topic. 
Following the work of Chavas and Holt (1990), growers’ risk behavior became an 
important element in the study of their allocation choices (i.e. Liang et al., 2011; Nivens 
et al., 2002; Wang et al., 2001).  
 In addition to the production and price variability, fresh vegetable growers face 
increased uncertainty due to the special characteristics of their product. For instance, the 
high perishability of most fresh produce results in limited storage opportunities; thus, the 
vegetable supply in the short run is highly inelastic (Sexton and Zhang, 1996; Cook, 
2011). As a result, growers are compelled to accept the price during or close to the 
harvesting period. Consequently, plant and harvest timing plays an important role in the 
income received from vegetable production. Furthermore, the impact of quality on the 
prices of fresh vegetables should not be understated. Specifically, if the vegetable 
produced does not reach the quality standards expected by the buyer (i.e. consumers, 
retailers, intermediaries, etc.) then the growers have to accept a lower price (Hueth and 
Ligon, 1999).  
Despite an abundance of research regarding growers’ decisions under uncertainty 
and the increased risk faced by vegetable growers, the literature regarding how 1) 
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growers’ risk aversion levels and 2) consideration of price seasonality1 impact the 
production decisions, particularly timing of planting and harvest, is limited2. The research 
presented is an effort to fill this gap.  
The objectives of this study are threefold. First, the study seeks to develop a dual 
crop vegetable farm model with a land allocation and production timing decision 
interface focusing on economic optimization. Second, it examines the effect of 
price/production variability and of growers’ risk preferences on their decisions regarding 
the optimal production practices (land allocation, transplant timing). Third, the study 
investigates potential alterations in optimal production practices and in the economic 
results with and without considering seasonal price trends, a factor that may influence 
growers’ production timing decisions. Mathematical programming modeling in 
conjunction with biophysical simulation techniques will be used to achieve these goals.    
The focus area for the present paper is Fayette County, Kentucky. The following 
two reasons dictated the selection of Fayette County as study region: i) it is among the 
top vegetable producing counties in Kentucky (2007 Census of Agriculture) and ii) the 
abundance and availability of weather and soil data. These data are essential requirements 
for the biophysical simulation.  
Kentucky was ranked 42 out of 50 states within the U.S.A. based on the 2010 
value of farm cash vegetable receipts. However, the importance of vegetable crops in the 
overall agricultural economy of the state is rising. Two facts highlight the growing role of 
vegetable production in Kentucky. First, in contrast to the overall decline of farm 
numbers in the state, there is an increase in the number of farms with some type of 
                                                            
1 Price seasonality is defined as the price patterns occurring within a “crop marketing period” 
2 A notable exception is Simmons and Pomareda (1975) 
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vegetable crop from 1,086 (1997) to 2,123 in 2007 (2007 Census of Agriculture). Second, 
there is a steady growth in the annual farm cash receipts from $8.7 million (1997) to 
$24.7 million in 2007 (USDA/ERS Vegetables and Melon Outlook). 
The latter fact indicates an additional opportunity for enhanced growth, since it 
represents a 51% increase in cash receipts per acre over a 10 year period, which 
annualizes to a modest growth of just over 4% annually or slightly more than the inflation 
rate. Looking at the demand side, the percentage of adults who consumed vegetables 
three or more times per day in Kentucky is higher than the national average (29.4% 
compared to 26%, Centers for Disease Control Prevention, 2010). This increased demand 
is coupled with growing interest among consumers for local products, due in part to the 
success of the Kentucky Proud program. These factors highlight a great range of 
opportunities for benefiting producers. 
Tomatoes and sweet corn are the crops included in the whole farm economic 
model. These vegetables were selected because they are among the top vegetables 
produced in Kentucky, both in number of farms and in acres. Specifically, sweet corn 
was ranked first among vegetables in terms of acres and second in number of farms. 
Tomatoes were ranked first in terms of farm number and third in acres planted (2007 
Census of Agriculture). In addition to their overall importance in the agricultural sector of 
Kentucky, tomatoes and sweet corn were selected because growers can easily rotate 
among them (Coolong et al., 2010). 
The comparison of economic outcomes and the estimation of optimal production 
timing for vegetables, with and without consideration of seasonal price trends, constitute 
the main contribution of the study to the literature. Furthermore, it is among the first 
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research endeavors that utilize the Decision Support System for Agrotechnology Transfer 
(DSSAT) to overcome data limitations for economic studies that include multiple 
vegetables.   
2.2 Data Collection and Yield Validation 
The present section has the following three objectives: 1) discuss the biophysical 
simulation model used for the estimation of yield data, 2) illustrate how the biophysical 
simulation model was validated and 3) describe the sources of data used in the study. 
2.2.1 Yield Data Estimation 
One interesting strand of the applied economic/agricultural literature relates to 
efforts made by scholars with the goal of developing the most accurate possible model for 
yield forecasting. Two of the most widely cited techniques for yield forecasting are 
statistical regression equations and simulation methods (Walker, 1989; Kauffmann and 
Snell, 1997). The advantages and shortcomings of these two approaches have been 
widely discussed (Walker, 1989; Kaufmann and Snell, 1997; Tannura et al., 2008; Jame 
and Cutforth, 1996). Among the advantages of the biophysical simulation3 are: i) that 
there is no need to specify a functional form, ii) it can provide yield data for different 
weather and production practices, iii) the use of biological principles for crop growth and 
iv) the use of shorter time periods to estimate growth. However, it is more difficult to use 
simulation techniques for large geographical areas and there is no incorporation of 
historical yield data. 
A lack of yield data for the examined vegetables, the need to estimate the effects 
of different production practices and soil types on yields, the focus on a specific 
geographical area and the overall objective of using these data for economic modeling 
                                                            
3 Biophysical simulation is a special case of the simulation models (Musser and Tew, 1984) 
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suggest the use of biophysical simulation as the most appropriate yield estimation 
technique for the present study (Dillon et al. 1991).  
Biophysical simulation techniques have been extensively applied in the literature 
(e.g. Shockley et al., 2011; Deng et al., 2008; Archer and Gesch, 2003; Barham et al., 
2011). Among the several biophysical models that have been developed and used, the 
present study will utilize the Decision Support System (DSSAT v 4.0, Hoogenboom et 
al., 2004; Jones et al., 2003). DSSAT was selected for the following reasons: i) it is well 
documented, ii) it has been used and validated in numerous studies over the last 15 years 
and iii) it is well suited for the present study since it incorporates modules for the two 
examined vegetables (tomatoes and sweet corn).  
The minimum data set required in order to generate yield estimates using DSSAT 
include weather data, soil data and production practices information for the examined 
region (Fayette County, Kentucky). Daily weather data for 38 years (1971-2008)4 were 
obtained from the University of Kentucky Agricultural Weather Center. The data set 
includes information regarding daily minimum/maximum temperature and rainfall. The 
weather data collection was finalized with the calculation of solar radiation from DSSAT 
weather module. 
Soil data were gathered from the National Cooperative Soil Survey of NRCS. 
According to the soil maps the most common soil type in Fayette County is silt loams. 
Following Shockley (2010), the percent slopes from the soil maps are used as a criterion 
for distinguishing between deep and shallow soils. Specifically, if the slope is between 
0% - 6% then the soil is characterized as deep. If the slope is between 6% - 20% then the 
soil is characterized as shallow. Based on these scales, 65% of the land is classified as 
                                                            
4 These years of weather data were available when the biophysical model of the study was constructed  
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deep silt loam and 35% as shallow. Furthermore, the default soil types of DSSAT were 
modified to better depict the characteristics of Fayette County soil conditions. Soil color, 
runoff potential, drainage and percent soil slope were among the parameters modified. 
Table 2.1 reports the exact specifications of the used soil types. Last but not least, the 
seasonal analysis option of DSSAT is used for the yield simulation. Under this option the 
soil water conditions, nutrients and organic matter are reset to initial levels every year on 
January 1.  
Information about the typical production practices for the vegetables considered 
in the study is obtained from the University of Kentucky Extension Service Bulletins 
(Coolong et al.; 2010). Tomatoes in the examined region are transplanted from early May 
(spring crop) through early August (fall crop). Regarding sweet corn, planting period 
extends from April 20 to July 20. In addition, 65 to 80 days after transplant and 70 to 95 
days after planting are the typical harvest periods for tomatoes and sweet corn 
respectively. Including all the combinations of transplanting/planting days and harvesting 
periods requires modeling for 9,5005 treatments, the inclusion and evaluation of such is 
beyond the scope of this study. The production practices examined here included eight bi-
weekly transplanting days for tomatoes (starting May 1) and ten weekly planting days for 
sweet corn (starting April 25). Four, weekly harvest periods for each crop were initially 
included in the model6.  
   
                                                            
5 (120 transplanting days*15 harvesting days for tomatoes)+(120 planting days for sweet corn*25 
harvesting days)* 2 for the 2 soil types examined 
6 63, 70, 77, 84 days after transplant for tomatoes and 70, 77, 84 and 91 days after planting for sweet 
corn. 
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2.2.2 Yield Validation 
Due to data limitations7, two non-statistical validation methods were used in the present 
paper. First, the estimated yields were presented to Dr. Timothy Coolong8 and he was 
asked whether or not they were a reasonable representation of expected yields in Central 
Kentucky for the crops evaluated based on his observations and experience. Some 
parameters of the biophysical model (i.e. fertilizer levels, irrigation, etc.) were modified 
based on his recommendations. For instance, based on the simulated yield results and on 
Dr. Coolong’s suggestions, three harvest periods (63, 70, 77 days) for tomatoes and one 
(84 days) for sweet corn are kept in the final model formulation9 instead of the four 
initially included. One cultivar was examined for each of the two crops because only one 
was available from DSSAT v4. Detailed information regarding the production practices 
included in the model is reported in Table 2.2. The simulated yields were considered 
higher than what an average vegetable grower can achieve but not unreasonable for the 
best producers. Table 2.3 reports summary statistics for the simulated yields.  
Second, the simulated yields were compared with findings from previous studies. 
Specifically, for tomatoes, consistent with past research (i.e. Hossain et al.; 2004, 
Huevelink; 1999, Schweers and Grimes; 1976) the simulated yields are substantially 
influenced by transplant period. Furthermore, consistent with the aforementioned studies 
simulated yields had approximately a bell shaped form (Figure 2.1). Similarly, in 
agreement with previous research for sweet corn (Williams, 2008; Williams and  
Linquist, 2007), our findings illustrate that planting date plays an important role in 
                                                            
7 The historical yield data available was too limited to do a validation through regression. 
8Extension Vegetable Specialist, Assistant Extension Professor, University of Kentucky. 
9 84 days harvest period for tomatoes and 70, 77 and 91 days for sweet corn are excluded from the final 
formulation since the simulated yields, for these periods, are not achievable in the examined area.  
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production, with yield decreasing substantially during later planting periods (Figure 2.2). 
There is no comparison of absolute values between the simulated yields and yields in the 
previous studies due to the differences in soil and weather conditions.    
Finally, the simulated yields were compared with four experimental trials for 
tomatoes (Rowell et al.; 2004, Rowell et al., 2005; Rowell et al., 2006; Coolong et al., 
2009) and one for synergistic sweet corn (Jones and Sears, 2005) conducted in Fayette 
County and Eastern Kentucky respectively. Regarding tomatoes, the biophysical 
simulation results compare favorably to the highest yielding cultivars. For sweet corn, the 
average simulated yields are slightly lower than the best yellow cultivar of the 
experimental trial.  
2.2.3 Economic and Resource Data Estimation 
In addition to the data requirements for the biophysical simulation model the 
following supplementary data were needed in order to achieve the objectives of the 
present study: 1) price data for the examined vegetables, 2) suitable field hours per day, 
3) land availability, 4) input requirements and input prices.  
Weekly price data for 13 years (1998-2010) were obtained from the USDA 
Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS). Specifically, the Atlanta terminal market prices 
are used. AMS terminal market reports are created using price data on vegetables traded 
at the local wholesale markets for 15 major cities. The price information is received by 
wholesalers for vegetables that are of “good merchantable quality” (USDA, 2012). The 
tomato data set used in the study includes information for different variety (mature 
greens, immature greens, vine-ripe), crop size (medium, large, extra-large) and package 
size (20 and 25 pound boxes). However, DSSAT v 4.0.2 does not differentiate yield 
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based on product variety and tomato size. In order to overcome this difficulty, following 
Dr. Coolong’s recommendations, two assumptions are made: i) 90% of yield is assumed 
to be mature green (the rest 10% is immature greens or vine ripes) and ii) the simulated 
yield is divided in three sizes based on the following distribution: 15% medium, 60% 
large and 25% extra-large. The prices were transformed in a $/pound base. Considering 
that the price data set provides limited information regarding quality and the same is true 
for the biophysical simulation model, no specific quality assumptions are made. Thus, the 
whole harvest (after a 20% reduction for cull tomatoes) was considered of good 
merchantable quality. For sweet corn, prices are transformed in a $/dozen basis. The price 
set used is for yellow sweet corn.  
Since there was a yearly trend detected in the price data set, in order to avoid 
overestimating the price variance, the Hodrick and Prescott (HP) filter is used to remove 
the trend movements. Following Ravn and Uhling (2002), a smoothing parameter (λ) of 
6.25 is used. Table 2.3 reports summary statistics for the price data set. The combination 
of 13 years of price data with 38 years of simulated yield generates 494 (13*38) different 
states of nature. This approach for determining the underlying revenue distribution 
assumes a perfectly competitive environment wherein the producer does not impact 
prices received. Furthermore, it is consistent with low correlation between prices and 
yield calculated for the data used.   
 Field conditions dictate whether or not a given time is suitable for fieldwork. 
Following Shockley et al. (2011), the probability of not raining more than 0.15 inches per 
day over weekly periods for the 38 years of weather data available is first calculated. This 
probability was multiplied with the days worked in a week and the hours worked in a day 
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to determine expected suitable field hours per week. The land constrained was set at 5 
acres based on information obtained from the 2010 Kentucky Produce Planting and 
Marketing Intentions Grower Survey and Outlook (Woods, 2010).  
The Mississippi State Budget Generator (MSBG) is used to estimate weekly labor 
requirements and input cost per acre for tomatoes and sweet corn. MSBG is a software 
tool (Laughlin and Spurlock, 2007) developed by Mississippi State University that 
utilizes machinery costs, input prices (i.e. fertilizes, fuel etc.) and labor cost to calculate a 
per acre cost for a field operation (Ibendhal and Halich, 2010). For the present study, the 
2012 vegetable budget files of MSBG were modified to depict the Fayette County 
specifications. In detail, input requirements and prices were modified following the 
suggestions of Dr. Coolong and the 2008 vegetable budget developed by the University 
of Kentucky extension service publications10. A detailed representation of the included 
costs is reported in Table 2.4. 
2.3 Theoretical Framework 
This section will provide the theoretical background for the economic model that 
will be implemented in the study. Whole farm economic analysis has been used by 
scholars to answer important questions such as: What is the optimal crop mix? Should I 
invest in new technologies? What is the best rotation strategy? A review of related work 
is presented by Lowe and Preckel (2004). 
An interesting modeling aspect of the whole farm analysis is associated with the 
efforts made to incorporate risk in the objective function. Among the most frequently 
implemented techniques to cope with this issue is the mean-variance (E-V) formulation 
originally developed by Markowitz (1952). One of the following conditions must be 
                                                            
10 Available at http://www.uky.edu/Ag/CDBREC/vegbudgets08.html 
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satisfied in order for the results of E-V analysis to be equivalent to expected utility 
theory: i) the utility function of the decision maker is quadratic, ii) normal distribution of 
outcomes (net returns), iii) Meyer’s location-scale (L-S) condition (Dillon, 1992). The 
first two conditions are overly restrictive and have well documented theoretical 
deficiencies. For instance, quadratic utility functions have the unrealistic characteristics 
of wealth satiation and increasing absolute risk aversion (Bigelow, 1993). 
Considering the previously mentioned limitations the more general L-S condition 
is adopted for the present study. Since yields and price for sweet corn and tomatoes are 
the stochastic elements of net returns it is sufficient to illustrate that they satisfy the L-S 
condition. Following Dillon (1992) a sufficient condition to meet the L-S requirements is 
for the ranked yields to be linear function of one another. The minimum correlation for 
the ranked yields was 97% and for ranked prices 87%. Thus, the use of mean variance 
analysis is considered legitimate for this study. Quadratic programming is commonly 
used to produce efficient E-V frontiers. The present study utilizes a formulation 
consistent with Freund (1956). 
2.4 Empirical Framework 
This section will discuss in detail the formulation of the economic model that is 
used in this paper. Specifically, an E-V formulation will be implemented to depict the 
economic environment of a hypothetical fresh vegetable farm in Fayette County, 
Kentucky. In line with Dillon (1999), the proposed model incorporates accounting 
variables as well as endogenous calculation of net returns variance instead of a variance-
covariance matrix. 
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The objective of the grower is the maximization of net returns above selected 
variable costs less the risk aversion coefficient multiplied by the variance of net returns. 
The hypothetical farm is assumed to have five acres of cropland available and grow 
tomatoes and sweet corn in rotation with 50% of acres in any year devoted to each crop. 
This represents a two year crop rotation which is commonly followed by growers in the 
examined region (Coolong et al., 2010). This will lead to a maximum of 2.5 acres with 
tomatoes, which is close to the average acres cultivated with tomatoes in Kentucky 
reported from an unpublished survey of wholesale tomato growers (Vassalos et al., 
2012). Rotation is required to prevent pathogen build up in the soil and control certain 
insects such as corn rootworms (Coolong et al., 2010). In addition to land limitation and 
rotation, the model includes the following constraints: i) labor resource limitation, ii) 
sales balance by crop and year, iii) input purchases by input, iv) net return balance and v) 
ratio of soil type. The final constraint guarantees that production practices will be 
distributed across both soil depths. 
The model will be estimated for the following two scenarios: 1) the grower 
considers seasonal price trends and 2) the grower considers only annual price trends. The 
aforementioned scenarios do not necessarily reflect growers with different price 
information knowledge. They examine the conscious decision of a grower to adjust, or 
not, the production timing decisions based on the historical price trends. More precisely, 
the seasonal price trend scenario incorporates an interaction of seasonal price movement 
with yield differences associated with the alternative production practices examined. 
The reason for examining these two scenarios vis-à-vis lies on the importance of 
production timing discussed earlier. Presumably, one of the factors that can drive optimal 
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timing decisions is whether or not the growers consider historical price trend information. 
This is especially true for fresh vegetable marketing which is characterized by substantial 
price seasonality (Figure 2.3).   
The thirteen years of weekly price data for tomatoes and sweet corn from AMS 
are employed for the estimation of the first scenario (seasonal trends). A two-step 
experimentation process is adopted for the latter scenario (yearly trends). First, the 
optimal management decisions are identified when only considering the annual average 
price for each AMS year. Second, these optimal decisions are imposed in the 
optimization model with the complete weekly historical price information to ascertain 
actual economic outcome. It is important to mention that the model in the present study is 
a steady state equilibrium model and that the decision variables do not alter by state of 
nature under both scenarios.   
In addition to the risk neutral case, the two specifications of the model (with and 
without full price information) were estimated for nine different risk aversion 
coefficients. These coefficients were calculated using the McCarl and Bessler (1989) 
approach. Based on this approach, a grower is said to maximize the lower limit from a 
confidence interval of normally distributed net returns. Each one of the nine examined 
levels in this study corresponds to a 5% increment from the previous level, starting from 
50% (risk neutral) and ending with 95%. The mathematical specification of the model 
follows: 
The grower’s objective is to maximize net returns above selected variable costs less the 
risk aversion coefficient multiplied by the variance of net returns and is given by: 
2.1 	 	  
18 
 
Subject to: land availability constraint, given by: 
2.2 , , . 	 	 ⩝ 	 
Weekly labor resource limitation, given by: 
2.3 , , , , , , 	⩝  
Marketing balance: 
2.4 , , , , , , , 	 , , , 0	 ⩝ , , , 	 
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Input purchases by input: 
2.5 	 , , , , , 0		 ⩝  
Soil depth ratio constraint: 
2.6 " " , , ," " 	 " " , , ," "
0	 ⩝ , ,  
Crop rotation constraint: 
2.7 , , , 	 0.5	 	⩝  
Net returns by year are given by: 
2.8 	 , , , , , , 	 0	 ⩝  
Expected profit balance is given by: 
2.9
1
	 0 
Where, activities include: Indices include: Coefficients include: 
: Expected net returns above 
selected variable cost 
C: Crop 
S: Soil depth 
Φ: Risk aversion  
Coefficient 
, , , : Production of crop C, 
under transplanting/planting 
period D, harvesting period H and 
soil depth S 
TS: Tomato Size 
(medium, large, extra-
large). There is only one 
size for sweet corn. 
, , : Weekly price for 
different tomato sizes in $/pound and for 
sweet corn in $ per ear 
 
, : Purchases of input I 
: Net returns above selected 
variable cost by year 
H: Harvesting period (1 
for sweet corn) 
YR: Year 
, , , , : Expected yield of tomatoes 
by size in pounds and of sweet corn by 
ears 
, , , : Tomato sales 
by size (medium, large, extra-
large in pounds and sweet corn 
sales in dozens of ears by week 
and year respectively 
D: Transplant date for 
tomatoes, Planting date 
for sweet corn 
WK: Week 
I: Input 
: Available field days per 
week 
: Rotation matrix by crop C 
, , : Weekly price in $/pounds per 
tomato size and in $/ear for sweet corn 
  N: State of Nature 
(13*38) 
 
" ": Ratio of total acres 
allocated to depth S 
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2.5 Results 
The results obtained from the mean-variance quadratic formulation, in 
conjunction with a discussion about them, are presented in this section. Tables 2.5 and 
2.6 report results for three of those nine risk levels: low (65% significance level), medium 
(75% significance level) and high (85% significance level) risk aversion, as well as the 
risk neutral case. The selection of the above mentioned risk aversion attitudes was made 
in order to better depict the changes that take place in the optimal decisions (i.e. 
transplant/plant and harvest timing) and the economic outcomes as the risk aversion level 
increases. 
2.5.1 Optimal Production Management Results 
In order to achieve the best possible economic outcome, and reduce their risk 
exposure (if they are risk averse), growers need to take into consideration production 
timing. This is especially true for fresh vegetable production where even the most basic 
decisions, such as when to plant, can lead to significant improvement or decline of 
economic results due to: i) the price variability and ii) the seasonal and perishable 
attributes of fresh produce. Table 2.5 reports the model results regarding three possible 
production strategies: i) land allocation/production mix, ii) planting schedule and iii) 
harvesting schedule. 
As far as land allocation choice is concerned, due to the rotation constraint, 50% 
of the available acres are devoted to tomato production and 50% to sweet corn for all risk 
aversion levels and for both scenarios examined. Furthermore, all the available acres 
(five) are used by the hypothetical farm.  
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Regarding the optimal transplant/plant and harvest timing, two strategies are 
observed from Table 2.5, depending on risk aversion levels. Under the seasonal price 
trend consideration scenario, a risk neutral grower who seeks to maximize expected net 
returns should focus on a combination of late tomato transplanting (July 10, July 24) and 
late sweet corn planting (June 21), as well as late tomato harvest (77 days after 
transplant). Under this plan the grower can receive higher prices, on average, for 
tomatoes and sweet corn. 
As risk aversion levels increase and growers are willing to accept lower but more 
certain net returns, two risk mitigating strategies are suggested from the findings. First, 
risk averse growers should focus on an earlier tomato transplanting period compared to 
risk neutral farmers (June 12 instead of July 24). Specifically, the higher the risk aversion 
level the greater the transition to earlier period is observed in terms of acres cultivated 
with tomatoes (Table 2.5). This transition indicates a movement from a focus on higher 
prices to focus on higher yields and more stable prices. Specifically, the price coefficient 
of variation drops from 19% (July 24, 77 days harvest) to 10% (June 12, 77 days harvest) 
and the weighted average price declines from approximately $16.30 per 25 pound box to 
$13.40.  
A Similar strategy (transition to earlier planting period for a risk averse grower 
compared to risk neutral) is observed for sweet corn (Table 2.5). In antithesis to tomato 
production, the land allocation for sweet corn does not change further with higher risk 
aversion levels. Besides reducing the price variation, an additional benefit of earlier 
planting for sweet corn is the reduced ear worm pressure.   
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In contrast to the first scenario, the second model formulation (where the grower 
has limited knowledge of the price set or consciously decided not to use the whole price 
information) findings indicate only minor changes in production schedule as risk aversion 
levels increase (Table 2.5). Specifically, tomato transplant and sweet corn planting 
periods remain the same across all four risk aversion level with a small increase of acres 
devoted to later transplanting periods (June 26) for higher risk coefficients. Last but not 
least, for both formulations the number of transplanting dates for tomatoes increases from 
two to three for the highest risk aversion level in seeking production practice 
diversification. 
Regarding tomato harvesting, the model always recommends as the optimal 
schedule harvesting 77 days after transplant (Table 2.5). The higher yields and prices 
associated with these periods (in contrast with 63 and 70 days after transplant) explain 
this choice (Figures 2.1, 2.2).  
2.5.2 Economic Results 
The economic results associated with the previously mentioned production 
strategies are reported in this section. As can be seen from Table 2.6, the average net 
returns above selected variable costs, the coefficient of variation and the minimum 
possible net returns vary substantially between the different risk aversion levels and 
among the two model formulations. 
Risk neutral growers under the full within season price distribution 
knowledge/consideration scenario have an average net return above selected variable 
costs of $85,382 combined with a coefficient of variation (C.V.) of 24.52%. As the level 
of risk aversion increases, in line with the underlying theory, a decline in both average 
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net returns and C.V. is noticed. For instance, the mean net returns for a highly risk averse 
grower correspond to 88% of the risk neutral case, while those for the low risk aversion 
scenario corresponded to 96%. However, the risk neutral case is associated with higher 
levels of standard deviations and coefficient of variation (almost 7% greater than the 
highly risk averse case).  
The importance and impact of a farm manager’s conscious consideration of price 
seasonality is investigated as a primary objective of this study. This is accomplished by 
calculating the economic outcomes that would result from a suboptimal solution ignoring 
the weekly fluctuation in prices. This depicts a more naïve production strategy that 
disregards within season price variation. Results provide evidence to support the 
importance of timing both in terms of enhanced profitability and greater potential for risk 
management.  
As can be seen from Table 2.6, a risk neutral grower who schedules production 
timing with consideration of weekly price variation enjoys 15% higher expected net 
returns compared to one who disregards the ability to exploit production timing based on 
price information. Furthermore, a greater opportunity to manage risk is permitted for the 
former hypothetical grower. Specifically, under the first scenario the coefficient of 
variation (C.V.) ranges from 17% to 24.7%. On the other hand, under the second 
scenario, C.V. has a substantially reduced span from 17.14% to 17.56% with the 
interesting finding that higher risk aversion levels are associated with higher C.V. in 
contrast to the initial expectations. These findings validate the hypothesis that growers 
who decide to plan production without consideration of seasonal price variation have 
limited opportunities to manage risk.      
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Finally, a comparison of the estimated net returns above selected variable costs 
with a 2008 vegetable budget (Crop Diversification & Biofuel Research & Education, 
University of Kentucky) resulted in some thought provoking observations. Specifically, 
the estimated net returns (on a per acre basis) are from 1.5 (highly risk averse) to two 
times (risk neutral) greater than the ones reported on the 2008 vegetable enterprise 
budget. This difference can be attributed to the combination of the conservative 
price/yield estimations of the extension service in contrast to the higher prices (obtained 
from the Atlanta AMS) and yields (from the biophysical simulation) used in the study.  
However, the findings of the study are closer to the estimations of Rowell et al. (2006) 
who indicate that for the best tomato cultivars that season it is possible to achieve close to 
$16,000 per acre.  
2.6 Conclusions 
The present study combines biophysical simulation and mathematical 
programming modeling to develop and economic model that will provide some 
guidelines regarding the optimal production mix and planting decisions for vegetable 
production. The area of study was Fayette County, Kentucky and the enterprises of 
tomatoes and sweet corn were evaluated. 
 Considering the importance of production timing, due to the perishability of 
vegetable production, and the role that seasonal price trends consideration may play in 
optimal transplant/planting and harvesting schedules, two distinct scenarios are 
examined. Under the first, the hypothetical grower plans production timing considering 
weekly price variation, while, under the second one the grower chooses a simpler but less 
complete focus of annual price trends only. Three risk aversion levels are examined for 
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each scenario. The findings indicate that vegetable producers have the potential to 
improve their economic results if they follow a structured farm management plan. 
Specifically, under the first formulation (full price knowledge) growers can achieve 
average net returns that are from 4% to 15% higher than the ones from the second 
formulation (not full price knowledge). Furthermore, they have greater opportunity to 
manage risk.   
 Limitations of this study are primarily associated with the nature of the 
biophysical simulation model used. Specifically, yield estimations were made only for 
one variety and there are no calibrations for locally grown cultivars. Examination of 
different varieties may lead to different results, considering the different performance 
each variety has under different weather patterns and soil conditions. In addition to 
including more vegetables in the model, future work can investigate how the results are 
affected when multiple markets are examined simultaneously. 
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Figure 2.1: Simulated Tomato Yields11 
 
        Source: Biophysical simulation results 
 
                                                            
11 The graph depicts average tomato yields across years and soil types 
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Figure 2.2: Sweet Corn Yields12 
 
Source: Biophysical simulation results
                                                            
12 The graph depicts average sweet corn yields across years and soil types 
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Figure 2.3: Fresh Tomatoes Monthly Producer Price Index (1982=100) 
 
 Source: USDA, ERS Fresh Tomato Monthly Producer Price Index, U.S. Tomato Statistics 
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Table 2.1: Soil Characteristics 
Soil Color Drainage Runoff 
Potential 
Slope 
(%) 
Runoff 
Curve # 
Albedo Drainage 
rate 
Deep Silty 
Loam 
(65%) 
Brown Moderately 
Well 
Lowest 3 64 0.12 0.4 
Shallow 
Silty Loam 
(35%) 
Brown Somewhat 
Poor 
Moderately 
Low 
9 80 0.12 0.2 
Source: Shockley, 2010 
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Table 2.2: Summary of Production Practices Used in the Biophysical Simulation Model 
1) Tomato Production Practices 
Transplanting date May 1, May 15, May 29, June 12, June 26, 
July 10, July 24, August 7 
Harvesting period 63, 70, 77 days after transplant  
Cultivar BHN 66 
Actual N/week (lbs/acre) 10 
Irrigation Drip irrigation, 1 inch water/week 
Plant population (plants/acre) 5,000 
Transplant age 42 days 
Planting depth 2.5 inches  
Assumptions Dry Matter = 6%, Cull ratio = 20% 
2) Sweet Corn Production Practices 
Planting Date April 25, May 2, May 9, May 16, May 23, 
May 30, June 7, June 14, June 21, June 28 
Harvesting Period 84 days after planting 
Cultivar Sweet corn cultivar of DSSAT v. 4 
Actual N/week 2 applications of Ammonium Nitrate. One 
pre-plant (90 lb. actual N/acre) and a 
second 4 weeks after planting (50 lb. actual 
N/acre) 
Irrigation Drip irrigation, 1 inch water/week 
Plant Population (plants/acre) 20,000 
Planting Depth 
Assumptions 
2 inches 
Dry matter =24%, Cull ratio= 3%, Ear 
weight = 0.661 pounds 
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Table 2.3: Price and Yield Summary Statistics13 
TOMATO YIELDS BY SIZE (simulated) 
  MEDIUM  LARGE  EXTRA LARGE 
Average (pounds/acre)   6,580  26,321  10,967 
Standard Deviation  1,976.92  7,907.67 3,294.86 
Coefficient of Variation  30.00  30.00  30.00 
Maximum Yield  10,425  41,700  17,375 
Minimum Yield  0  0  0 
TOMATO PRICES 
  MEDIUM  LARGE  EXTRA LARGE 
Average ($/25 pound boxes)  $15.04  $15.56  $16.31 
Standard Deviation    3.12    3.48    3.84 
Coefficient of Variation  20.00  22.00  23.00 
Maximum Price ($/25 pound box)  29.55  30.58  30.70 
Minimum Price ($/25 pound box)    8.99    9.77    9.68 
SWEET CORN YIELD (simulated, one size) 
Average (ears/acre)  12,687 
Standard Deviation  6,140 
Coefficient of Variation  47.00 
Maximum Yield  28,579 
Minimum Yield  903 
SWEET CORN PRICE  
Average ($/crate)  $13.04 
Standard Deviation    3.94 
Coefficient of Variation  30.00 
Maximum Price($/crate)  33.78 
Minimum Price($/crate)    6.56 
Source: DSSAT model yield results, Atlanta Agricultural Market Station prices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
13 The maximum and minimum yields reported on the table refer to different production practices, thus 
one is not expected to add the maximum yield of medium, large and extra‐large to obtain maximum yield 
per acre 
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Table 2.4: Production Costs per Acre  
Tomato Expenses Sweet Corn Expenses 
Type of Expense  Cost($) Type of Expense Cost ($) 
Fertilizer   319.67 Fertilizer 194.16 
Herbicide       2.33 Herbicide   21.16 
Insecticide     97.47 Insecticide 208.10 
Seed &  planting supplies 1575.08 Seed &  planting supplies 126.00 
Labor 3688.26 Labor 116.58 
Machinery expenses   139.69 Machinery expenses   66.76 
Other expenses (i.e. boxes) 1600.00 Other expenses (i.e. crates) 580.00 
Interest on capital     76.00 Interest on capital   10.58 
Irrigation supplies   627.00 Irrigation supplies  410.00 
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Table 2.5: Summary of Optimal Production Practices by Risk Attitude 
Model 1: Seasonal Price Trend 
 Tomatoes14 Sweet Corn 
Risk  
Levels 
Transplanting 
 Date 
Acres (% of total) Planting 
Day 
Acres (% of total) 
DSLa SSLb DSL SSL 
Risk Neutral July 10 27.0%  14.7% June 21 32.5% 17.5% 
 July 24   5.2%    2.8%    
Low Risk Aversion June 12   5.4%    3.0% May 23 32.5% 17.5% 
 July 10 27.0%  14.6%    
Medium Risk Aversion June 12 16.6%    9.0% May 23 32.5% 17.5% 
 July 10 16.0%    8.6%    
High Risk Aversion June 12 23.0%  12.4% May 23 32.5% 17.5% 
 July 10   8.4%    4.4%    
 July 24   1.2%    0.6%    
                                           Model 2: Yearly Trend 
 Tomatoes Sweet Corn 
Risk 
Levels 
Transplanting 
Date 
Acres (% of total) Planting 
Day 
Acres (% of total) 
DSL SSL DSL SSL 
Risk Neutral June 12 26.8% 14.4% May 30 32.5% 17.5% 
 June 26   5.7%   3.0%    
Low Risk Aversion June 12 15.0%   8.2% May 30 32.5% 17.5% 
 June 26 17.4%   9.4%    
Medium Risk Aversion June 12 14.4%   7.8% May 30 32.5% 17.5% 
 June 26 18.0%   9.8%    
High Risk Aversion June 12 14.2%   7.6% May 30 32.5% 17.5% 
 June 26 16.8%   9.0%    
 July 10   1.4%   0.8%    
Source: Economic Model Results 
a DSL stands for Deep Silty Loam 
b SSL stands for Shallow Silty Loam 
 
                                                            
14 Optimal harvesting period for tomatoes, for all the risk aversion levels and for both models, is 77 days 
after tranplanting. 
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Table 2.6: Net Returns by Risk Attitude 
  Model 1: Seasonal Price Trend 
Economic 
Results 
Risk 
Neutral 
Low Risk 
Aversion 
Medium Risk 
Aversion 
High Risk 
Aversion 
Mean ($) 84,573 81,492 77,192 74,391 
Min ($) 42,064 48,676 48,216 46,497 
Standard Deviation ($) 20,939 16,914 14,120 12,816 
Coefficient of Variation 24.76 20.76 18.29 17.13 
Model 2: Yearly Trend 
Economic 
Results 
Risk 
Neutral 
Low Risk 
Aversion 
Medium Risk 
Aversion 
High Risk 
Aversion 
Mean($) 71,827 71,429 71,407  71,994 
Min($) 41,807 40,282 40,202  40,970 
Standard Deviation ($) 12,453 12,562 12,582  12,783 
Coefficient of Variation 17.34 17.59 17.62  17.76 
Source: Economic Model Results 
   
Copyright © Michael Vassalos 2013
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Chapter 3: Fresh Vegetable Growers’ Risk Perception, Risk Preference and Choice 
of Marketing Contracts: A Choice Experiment 
3.1 Introduction 
Fresh vegetable production is a high risk farming activity. Fresh vegetable 
growers, in addition to the traditional sources of risk associated with farming (i.e., 
production, price, and financial risk), face increased uncertainty due to the characteristics 
of their products (Cook, 2011; Ligon, 2001; Hueth and Ligon, 1999). Some of those 
characteristics include: i) the perishability of fresh vegetable products, ii) the lack of 
traditional policy measures (i.e., price and income support programs) and futures 
markets, and iii) the importance of quality of production. 
Fresh vegetable growers have limited opportunities to mitigate this risk. A 
possible option towards this goal is the adoption of marketing contracts. Marketing 
contracts typically refer to a written or oral agreement between a grower and a buyer who 
set a price and possible price adjustments, including quality specifications, a delivery 
period schedule, and other terms of transaction (MacDonald et al., 2004; Katchova and 
Miranda, 2004). Under this type of agreement, producers assume all risk related to 
production (yield, quality, etc.) and input prices, but share risk related to output market 
price with the buyer (MacDonald et al., 2004).  
A number of arguments have been presented in the literature to explain the 
increased use of contractual arrangements. First, contract agreements help both parties to 
better manage risk (Wolf et al., 2001; MacDonald, 2004). Second, the 
incentives/penalties embodied in a contractual agreement may act as catalysts to induce a 
particular behavior, i.e. provide better product quality (Hueth and Ligon, 1999; Wolf et 
al., 2001). Calvin et al. (2001) highlighted several reasons that shippers have for 
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contracting. Among the most important ones, according to ERS marketing study 
interviews (Calvin et al., 2001) are the secured markets and the maintenance of future 
relationships with buyers. Last but not least, contractual arrangements can help growers 
and buyers in their resource allocation decisions due to the predictability introduced into 
production (Hueth et al., 1999). 
Although extensive research has been conducted regarding several aspects of 
contractual agreements in agriculture, the literature regarding estimation of growers’ 
preferences and their willingness to accept/pay for different marketing contracts attributes 
is limited. A notable exception is Hudson and Lusk (2004), who used discrete choice 
experiments (DCE) to estimate the marginal values of six attributes (expected income, 
price risk shifted, autonomy, asset specificity, provision of inputs, length of contract) of 
hypothetical contracts using a sample of 49 growers from Mississippi and Texas. The 
findings of their study indicate that risk avoidance and transaction costs play a major role 
in the choice of contractual agreement. Furthermore, the study highlights the 
heterogeneity of preferences among growers. 
DCE analysis refers to a broad range of survey-based statistical techniques used 
by scholars in order to draw inferences for important questions such as: i) consumers’ 
preferences, ii) tradeoffs that consumers are willing to make in order to enjoy specific 
attributes, iii) how consumers may react to introduction of new products or changes in 
existing ones, and iv) market-share predictions (Green et al., 2001; Louviere et al., 
2010)15. Since marketing contracts can be described in terms of several distinct attributes, 
using DCE analysis in order to estimate the marginal value of them to growers is 
justifiable.  
                                                            
15 Discrete choice experiments (DCE) are referred in Green et al. (2001) as choice based conjoint analysis.  
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The objective of the study is twofold. First, the study seeks to examine growers’ 
preferences for a number of marketing contract attributes. Second, it investigates the 
effect of growers’ risk perceptions and risk preferences on the choice of a marketing 
contract agreement.  
The marketing contract attributes examined include different levels of price, 
volume requirements, transaction costs, and penalties. Elicitation of growers’ risk 
preference is achieved with the use of a “multiple price lists” design where growers are 
presented with several lottery choices and are asked to select one (Binswanger, 1980; 
Bisnwanger, 1981). Growers’ risk perception is determined through a number of Likert 
scale questions. 
A mail survey questionnaire was used to gather data from tomato producers and 
consisted of five sections. Supplementary data used included tomato prices and yields in 
order to design reasonable contract options for the choice experiment. Those data were 
obtained from the USDA Agricultural Marketing Service Atlanta Terminal Market and 
with the use of biophysical simulation, respectively. Growers’ preferences toward 
marketing contracts are estimated using mixed-logit modeling. This approach allows the 
relaxation of the restrictive independence from irrelevant attributes assumption and 
accounts for heterogeneity in preferences.  
The use of DCE techniques to examine preferences for fresh vegetable marketing 
contracts is a primary contribution of this study to the literature. In comparison with 
Hudson and Lusk (2004), the present study focuses on a specific crop (tomatoes) and 
group of growers (wholesale tomato growers), but the results have implications for both 
growers and a broader range of stakeholders who can benefit from the insights offered by 
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this study. These specifications allow the evaluation of more concrete contractual 
agreements. Last but not least, it is the first effort to examine how growers’ risk 
perceptions affects their choice of contracts.   
The findings of the study can provide useful insights both to policy makers and to 
the vegetable production industry. This is so for several reasons. Consumer interest in 
locally-sourced foods has increased dramatically, and marketing contracts are one 
method for commercial scale buyers and retailers to develop a reliable supply of local 
produce. Thus, a better understanding of farmers’ preferences can increase the adoption 
of mutually beneficial contracts. Second, information regarding farmers’ acceptance and 
perceived tradeoffs between the different attributes in interaction with their risk 
perception and risk preferences levels will provide useful intuition in better 
understanding how different producers view this emerging market. Finally, the study will 
further examine the importance of transaction costs in contractual agreements, which may 
give guidance to relevant policy.  
3.2 Data Collection and Survey Design 
The main data source for the study is a mail survey. The survey was administered 
to a sample of wholesale tomato producers in four states: Kentucky, Illinois, Ohio and 
Indiana. Growers who direct market the majority of their produce were excluded from the 
sample since they are less likely to operate under contractual agreements (MacDonald et 
al., 2004). Mailing information for the growers was gathered from the Market Maker web 
sites within these respective states, after obtaining permission to use the data base of the 
site. A total of 315 mailing addresses were retrieved.  
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From the 315 surveys, ten were returned for insufficient or wrong addresses and 
five were no longer farmers, leading to an effective survey group of 300 growers. In 
order to mitigate non-response bias problems, the three wave survey design (survey - 
reminder - survey) proposed by Dillman (1978) was implemented. A monetary incentive 
($25) was offered with the intention of boosting the response rate. The overall response 
rate was 18.3% (55 returned surveys) with an effective response rate of 16.3% (49 usable 
surveys). The sample size and the response rates for each state are presented in Table 3.1. 
Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 3.2. 
The study sample includes a greater percentage of women operators and slightly 
younger growers compared to 2007 Census of Agriculture (Table 3.2). Furthermore, the 
average acres with tomatoes in the study compare closely to the average of total 
harvested acres with tomatoes from the 2007 census of agriculture. The final form of the 
survey questionnaire (i.e., wording, ordering of questions, etc.) is the result of several 
focus group discussions with vegetable growers, extension specialists and persons 
involved with marketing of fresh vegetables. Two of the major focus groups took place 
during the 2011 Kentucky Farm Bureau Convention and the 2012 Kentucky Fruit and 
Vegetable Trade Show.   
The survey questionnaire consisted of five sections. First, general questions about 
the characteristics of the farm were solicited. The next section incorporated questions 
regarding growers’ perceptions and experience with marketing contracts. The third 
section asked questions related to growers’ risk comfort levels. The choice experiment is 
included in the fourth section. The survey concluded with questions on demographic 
characteristics. 
 
40 
 
The importance of various factors in growers’ decisions to participate, or not, in a 
marketing contract agreement is also examined in the second section of the survey 
instrument. More than 50% of growers indicated reduced price risk and secure income 
among the most important reasons for participating in a marketing contract agreement 
(Table 3.3). Considering the price volatility of fresh vegetable production, those 
preferences are not surprising. Conversely, 28 out of 49 respondents indicated 
unsatisfying price terms among the most important factors that may discourage them 
from participating in marketing contracts. Furthermore, a significant portion of 
respondents indicated that the difficulty of satisfying the quality and quantity 
requirements imposed in a marketing contract may discourage them from participating in 
such an agreement (Table 3.4).      
Two types of questions were used to elicit growers’ risk comfort levels (third 
section of the questionnaire). The first type of question was based on expected utility and 
the second type consisted of a self-rating. The former approach is based on an allocation 
game suggested by Gneezy and Potters (1997), Charness and Gneezy (2010) and 
Binswanger (1980, 1981). This approach is used to elicit growers’ risk preference. The 
latter is a series of Likert- scale questions based on Pennings and Garcia (2001). This 
approach is used to elicit growers’ risk perception. 
3.2.1 Conjoint Experiment and Selection of Attributes 
One of the first steps required in order to conduct a DCE analysis is the choice of 
product attributes and their corresponding levels that will be used in the study (Green et 
al., 2001). The following includes a discussion regarding the selection of contract 
attributes used in the study and of their levels.  
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The focus of the study on marketing contracts and on fresh vegetable production, 
in conjunction with previous literature and the discussions that took place during the 
focus groups, are the main factors that influenced the selection of attributes for the choice 
experiment. Under a marketing contract, in contrast to production contracts, growers bear 
all the risk associated with production (yield, quality) and input prices and share some or 
all of the output price risk (MacDonald et al., 2004; Ligon, 2001; Vavra, 2009). This is 
depicted in the choice experiment with the inclusion of volume and quality requirements 
and by eliminating possible requirements regarding varieties, production practices, etc. 
In detail, the choice profiles used in the study consisted of the following eight 
attributes: early period price, peak period price, late period price, early period volume, 
peak period volume, late period volume, certification cost, and penalties. The first seven 
attributes have three levels each and the penalties four levels. A description of these 
attributes and their levels is reported in Table 3.5. In addition to the previously mentioned 
contract attributes, an important requirement of the examined contracts relates to quality 
of tomatoes. Specifically, the examined contracts refer to U.S.D.A. number 1 grade 
tomatoes.  
Based on the number of attributes and their levels, a full factorial design 
corresponds to 8,748 (or 37 × 4) profiles. In order to reduce this number, a fractional 
factorial design was implemented. The fractional factorial design corresponds to a sample 
of the full factorial that retains the main and first order interaction effects (Louviere et al., 
2000). The %mktex macro algorithm in SAS returned 18 choice sets of two choices. In 
order to minimize the time to complete the questionnaire and mitigate the fatigue of the 
participants, those 18 sets were randomly distributed in groups of 6 to 3 versions taking 
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care not to include a clearly superior choice. In addition to the two choices, a third “no 
contract” choice was added. A sample choice experiment is reported in Figure 3.1. Each 
respondent was assigned to only one version of the survey (differ only in choice sets) and 
made 6 choices. As a result, a total of 49*6=294 choices are represented in the data.    
The price attribute refers to the monetary amount that the contractors should pay 
the growers during or before the payment deadline. Among the several price mechanisms 
suggested in the literature (Hueth and Ligon, 1998; Hueth and Melkonyan, 2004; Hueth 
and Ligon, 2002; Katchova and Miranda, 2004), a price per pound contingent on quality 
and period of the year is adopted for the examined contracts. Following Hueth and Ligon 
(1999) and Hueth and Melkonyan (2004), the payment offered depends on the tomato 
price of a downstream market. Specifically, USDA-AMS tomato prices from the Atlanta 
Terminal Market were used in the study as base prices. In order to capture the seasonal 
price variability of tomatoes and achieve a constant supply flow, three different time 
periods are used. Early period refers approximately to the period up to July 4, the peak 
period covers July and August and the late period spans September and October. 
Following the focus group discussion three different price levels are used for each period 
(Table 3.5). The range of prices provided to growers is abstract due to the lack of data 
from actual contractual agreements.  
Regarding volume requirements, the scarcity of detailed yield data leads to the 
use of biophysical simulation techniques. Specifically, tomato yields for thirty-eight years 
under different production practices (transplant days and harvesting days) were estimated 
with the use of the Decision Support System for Agrotechnology Transfer (DSSAT v.4, 
Hoogenboom et al., 2004). Validation of the simulated yields was made based on 
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previous literature (Ciardi et al., 1998; Heuvelink, 1999) and expert opinion for fresh 
market tomatoes grown in Kentucky. Specifically, the model parameters and the 
simulated yields were evaluated with Dr. Timothy Coolong, Extension Vegetable 
Specialist at the University of Kentucky. The estimated yields were considered higher 
than what an average producer may achieve but would be expected for experienced 
wholesale growers. Since growers do not generally contract all of their production 
(Katchova and Miranda, 2004), the volume requirements specified on the choice profiles 
correspond to 10%, 15% and 20% of the average yield calculated by DSSAT for each of 
the  three periods (early, peak and late). Similarly with the price per pound, the range of 
volume requirements is theoretical due to the lack of actual data from real contractual 
agreements.  
One of the most important provisions in a contractual agreement is related to the 
cost that growers have to face in case they fail to meet their obligations. A grower may 
face a penalty under the following two circumstances: i) failure to provide the agreed 
volume and ii) failure to provide the required quality. Analogous to price mechanisms, a 
number of different cost structures (penalties) have been suggested in the literature (Wolf 
et al., 2001; Hueth et al., 1999). In the context of the present study, the penalties are 
reported as price reductions. Four different penalty levels are used in the discrete choice 
experiment of the survey: 5%, 10% and 15% of price and terminate contract. The last 
option (terminate) indicates that the contract will no longer be valid and the grower will 
have to sell his production in the spot market.   
Considering that the price and penalty mechanisms of the examined contracts 
depend on the quality of the supplied tomatoes, a quality measurement instrument is 
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required in order to eliminate possible disputes among growers and buyers. A number of 
different quality validation options have been suggested in the literature (Hueth and 
Ligon, 1999; Wolf et al., 2001).  
The certification cost attribute corresponds to the payments that growers may 
have to provide for third party food-safety audits, one of the possible quality control 
options. Hatanaka et al. (2005) provide a review regarding the development of third party 
audits, their benefits and the challenges associated with those. Third party audits can be 
an expensive quality assurance function that larger buyers may require of their fresh 
produce suppliers as buyers try to manage food safety risks.  Part of the challenge for 
growers is the variation in certification requirements among buyers.  In any case, such 
audits have become a central element to the discussion regarding marketing arrangements 
between growers and buyers (Hatanaka et al., 2005; Mahshie, 2009).  Actual certification 
costs can vary, depending on the 3rd party auditor and the buyer requirements.  We used 
three levels of $0 (no requirement), $500 and $1000 to represent possible associated 
certification expenses based on direction from the growers in the focus groups. 
As far as the expected signs are concerned, Hudson and Lusk (2004) illustrated 
that increases in the expected income from contracts are positively related with the 
probability of contract adoption. On the other hand, higher transactions cost lead to lower 
probability of contracting. In the context of this study, the higher the price per pound 
offered, the higher the expected income for the grower. Thus, the a priori expectation is 
to have a positive sign associated with price per pound. Penalties and certification cost 
represent the transaction costs in the examined contracts. The higher they are, the more 
costly the contract enforcement, suggesting a negative influence in the adoption 
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probability. Finally, the higher the volume requirements are, the more difficult it will be 
for growers to satisfy the contract agreement, indicating a greater possibility of penalties. 
Thus, the initial expectation regarding volume requirements is that they will negatively 
influence the adoption probability.  
3.3 Econometric Models 
The conceptual foundation of DCE models lies on the seminal work of Lancaster 
(1966). In detail, Lancaster’s theory of demand posits that consumers gain utility from 
the characteristics that a good possesses rather than the “actual” good. Additionally, 
McFadden’s (1974) random utility theory (RUT) provides the theoretical background that 
connects consumers’ selection of an alternative and their utility (Louviere et al., 2000). 
Specifically, based on RUT, an individual’s (i) utility from choosing an alternative j in 
the t-th choice set can be expressed as a combination of two elements: one deterministic 
and one stochastic. This can be denoted as: 
3.1 	 	   
where β is a vector of unobserved parameters that will be estimated, Xijt is a vector of 
observed variables, and εijt is the random error term. The individual (i) will choose the 
alternative j that will generate the highest utility. 
The selection of the most appropriate statistical technique for the analysis of the 
data (i.e., conditional logit, multinomial probit, nested logit, etc.) depends on the 
assumptions that the researcher will make regarding the error term and on the 
experimental design of the DCE. 
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Specifically, under the assumption that the error term is independent and 
identically distributed, with an extreme value Type I distribution, then the probability that 
the individual (i) will choose the j alternative can be formulated as: 
3.2 	 	
∑
  
This corresponds to the conditional logit model (MacFadden, 1974). One important 
restriction associated with the conditional logit model is the assumption of independence 
of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) (Louviere et al., 2000). 
The mixed logit model (or random parameters logit) is an extension of the basic 
multinomial logit model (Train, 2003) that allows the relaxation of the restrictive IIA 
assumption. Furthermore, a number of additional desirable properties of mixed logit 
formulation have been discussed in the literature. First, the model accounts for 
heterogeneity in preferences (Louviere et al., 2000). Second, it allows for correlation of 
unobserved factors over time (Train, 2003). Third, the model does not restrict the 
distribution of random components to normal. A number of other distributions can be 
used, depending on the analysts’ assumptions. Lastly, the mixed logit model allows 
researchers to consider the panel data nature of most repeated choice data such as in this 
study. 
In contrast to conditional logit, in a mixed logit model, the unobserved vector of 
coefficients β varies in the population following a distribution function f (μ, v), with μ 
representing the mean and v the variance of the distribution. The objective of the mixed 
logit is the estimation of μ and v instead of β. As shown in Train (2003), the 
unconditional choice probability of mixed logit is expressed as: 
 
47 
 
3.3 	 	
∑
  
where, h(β) is the density function for the random parameters β. Due to the fact there is 
no closed form solution for equation (3), the integral is calculated using simulation 
techniques. 
3.4 Empirical Results 
The results obtained from the econometric estimation in conjunction with a 
discussion of them are presented in this section. In addition to the main effects 
estimation, both for conditional and mixed logit models, interaction terms between 
contract attributes and growers’ risk perception and risk preferences are estimated. Two 
approaches are used for the interpretation of the results. First, the statistical significance 
and the signs of the coefficients are discussed. Second, a monetary interpretation based 
on marginal values is provided. Following Hu et al. (2009), the marginal value (MV) in a 
mixed logit model is calculated as: 
3.4 	 	
	 ∗
	 ∗
 
where βattribute and βprice are the coefficients associated with a contract attribute and a price 
(early, peak, late season) respectively. D is a vector of risk preference or risk perception 
variables, and βattribute*D is estimated coefficient of the interaction term between attributes 
and the estimated risk variables. Under the marketing contract framework examined, MV 
can be generally interpreted as the amount by which the price per pound offered should 
be increased or decreased in order for a grower to accept a marginal increment in one of 
the contract attributes (eg. 1% increase in the penalty levels). 
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The results of the basic estimation, without any interaction terms, for the 
conditional and mixed logit models are reported in Table 3.6. Following the a priori 
expectations and in line with Hudson and Lusk (2004), the early price ($/lb.) attribute has 
a statistically significant and positive coefficient. Thus, ceteris paribus, growers show 
preference for contracts offering higher price for tomatoes expecting to reach the market 
early in the season (before July 4). Taking into account the greater yield risk associated 
with early planting, due to weather conditions, this finding is not surprising. 
The penalty and certification cost variables represent the transaction costs (cost of 
monitoring and enforcement) of the examined contracts. The highly statistically 
significant negative coefficients of these two attributes indicate the considerable negative 
impact they have on growers’ utility. Specifically for certification cost, this negative 
impact on utility can be attributed to two factors. First, growers seek to avoid higher 
transaction costs, since this will result in reduced income. Second, it may indicate 
growers’ reluctance to increase their dependence on quality determination from the buyer 
or third party audits. Especially if there is no scientific base for this quality verification16, 
the penalties may be activated easily, which would result in reduction of growers’ income 
or even termination of the contract. Lastly, these findings provide further empirical 
validation for the transaction cost theory (Allen and Lueck, 1995).  
The random variable “no contract” represents the third alternative in the choice 
sets. It is selected by growers if they would rather not choose any of the two contract 
alternatives offered. For both model estimations (conditional and mixed logit), the 
variable “no contract” is not statistically significant. This finding indicates that, on 
average, growers do not suffer utility loss if they do not have the option to participate in a 
                                                            
16 i.e. it is not uncommon to have multiple demands placed in to growers (Mahshie, 2009)  
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marketing contract agreement. However, under the mixed logit formulation, the standard 
deviation estimate of this coefficient is statistically significant. This result, in agreement 
with Hudson and Lusk (2004), indicates unobserved preference heterogeneity among 
growers.  
Regarding volume requirements, none of those described in this experiment  
(early, peak, late period volume) had a significant impact on growers’ utility (Table 3.6). 
Considering that the volume requirements included in the examined contracts do not 
exceed 20% of possible yield per acre, this finding is not surprising.  
The mixed logit formulation provided a slightly better fit as measured by the 
McFadden R2. The incorporation of the random variable (no contract) which indicated 
the existence of unobserved heterogeneity in growers’ preferences can explain this 
increase.  
Estimated marginal values (MV) resulting from the mixed logit formulation 
indicate that, in order to accept a 1% increase in penalty levels, growers must be 
compensated by $0.3/ lb. higher early price (Table 3.7). Considering the range of offered 
early price in the present study is $0.62/lb. - $0.72/lb., on average, growers want 0.4%-
0.5% higher early price to accept 1% increase in penalty levels. Similarly, the average 
MV of $0.0004 for certification cost (Table 3.7) indicated that growers must be offered a 
0.05% - 0.06% higher early price in order to accept a $1 increase in the expenditures 
associated with certification cost.  
3.4.1 Growers’ Risk Perception, Risk Preferences and Choice of Contracts 
The second objective of the study is to investigate how growers’ risk perception 
and risk preferences affect their selection of marketing contracts. The present section 
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discusses the techniques used to elicit growers’ risk preferences and risk perception as 
well as the results from the subsequent econometric estimation. 
An interesting strand of the contract literature refers to the examination of 
growers’ risk preferences and whether or not these affect the choice of contracts. Thus 
far, research findings regarding this issue are mixed. For instance, Ackerberg and 
Botticini (2002) and Hudson and Lusk (2004) indicate that risk is an important 
determinant of contract choice. On the other hand, findings from Allen and Lueck (1995, 
1999) illustrate that risk preferences do not have significant impact on the choice of 
contracts.  
Growers’ wealth, yield coefficient of variation, and risk transferred to the buyer 
are among the proxies used in the aforementioned studies to estimate growers’ risk 
preferences. The present paper uses a multiple price list design, following previous work 
(Binswanger, 1980; Binswanger, 1981; Gneezy and Potters, 1997; Charness and Gneezy, 
2010) in order to draw inferences regarding growers’ risk preferences. Specifically, in 
this experiment, growers were asked to select among two different hypothetical tomato 
plant varieties. The two plants have different levels of resistance to disease and, 
depending on whether or not the disease occurs, different economic returns. The 
probability that a disease will occur is 50%. Growers were presented with a set of six 
possible payoffs and were asked to select one (Figure 3.2).  
In accordance with Binswanger (1980), higher expected returns were offered at 
the cost of higher variance. The corresponding risk classification levels and the estimated 
partial risk aversion coefficient are reported at Table 3.8. Under the assumption that 
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growers’ exhibit constant partial risk aversion, the partial risk aversion coefficient can be 
estimated using a utility function of the following form (Binswanger, 1980):  
3.5 	 1  
Where M is the certainty equivalent and S is the approximate partial risk aversion 
coefficient17. In line with Lusk and Coble (2005), the measure used in the analysis as an 
individual’s risk aversion coefficient (S) is the midpoint of the possible minimum and 
maximum range of S18. Another alternative is to use the geometric average; however both 
approaches gave similar results. 
 In addition to growers’ risk preferences, their risk perception is also required in 
order to elicit optimal risk behavior (Lusk and Coble, 2005). Three Likert-scale questions 
from Pennings and Garcia (2001) were used to elicit growers risk perception (Table 3.9). 
A measure of growers’ risk perception is obtained by the sum of responses to questions 
1-3 (Lusk and Coble, 2005). 
After the elicitation of growers’ general risk perception and risk preferences, three 
specifications of the mixed logit framework were estimated (Table 3.10). In contrast to 
the main effects model, discussed previously, these specifications include grower-specific 
information that will provide a better interpretation of their preferences. In detail, 
growers’ general risk perception (Model 1), risk preference (Model 2), and an interaction 
term between risk preferences and risk perception (Model 3) are included in the 
                                                            
17 In order to calculate S (Table 8) we have to solve for the indifference point among two consecutive 
choices using equation 5. For instance, for choices A and B the S is calculated from the following equation: 
50(1‐s) + 50(1‐s) =40(1‐s) +70(1‐s). This equation can be solved in Excel or in Mathematica after graphing the 
equations to estimate where the functions crosses the x‐axes. 
18 Following Binswanger (1981), for the regression analysis alternative F (Table 3.8) was given a value near 
zero (0.18) and the value for alternative A was set to 2.47 
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estimation as interaction terms. In all the three model formulations, the “no contract” 
attribute is assumed to have a random coefficient.  
The results of the three estimated models are consistent with the findings of 
conditional logit and main effects mixed logit formulations, discussed previously. In 
detail, certification cost and penalty have negative impact on growers’ utility, while 
growers show preference for contracts with higher early price.  
Furthermore, findings from Model 1 illustrate that certification cost has a higher 
negative impact on utility of growers with higher general risk perception (RP) as 
indicated by the highly statistically significant, negative coefficient of the interaction 
term “certification cost*RP”. If selection of contracts is primarily driven by growers’ 
general risk perception then, in line with Hanaka’s (2005) suggestions, educational or 
financial assistance can be an important element in altering growers’ behavior in favor of 
marketing contract agreements.  
As can been seen from Model 2 findings (Table 3.10), growers’ risk aversion 
(RA) did not have any significant impact on their preferences regarding marketing 
contracts. However, when the interaction term between growers’ risk perception and risk 
aversion is included in the estimation (Model 3, Table 3.10), the interaction between this 
term and the certification cost is statistically significant with the expected negative sign.  
Marginal values based on the three previously mentioned models are also 
calculated. In order to gain a better understanding of how different growers’ value 
different contract attributes two levels of risk perception and risk preferences are 
examined. For risk perception these values are -2 and 2 representing risk seeking and risk 
averse growers. For risk aversion the selected levels are 0.5 and 2. For comparison 
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purposes, marginal values are also estimated for the average levels of risk aversion and 
risk preferences.  
Table 3.11 reports only the statistically significant results of these estimations. In 
contrast to the results from Model 1, none of the marginal values estimations for the risk 
perception interaction term are statistically significant. This finding indicates that the 
effects may not be large enough to have a perceptible value. On the other hand, the higher 
the growers’ risk aversion coefficient, the greater compensation (in terms of early price) 
they should be offered to accept a 1% increase in penalty or a $1 increase in certification 
cost.   
3.5 Conclusions  
The present study used discrete choice experiments in conjunction with estimation 
of random utility models to investigate: i) how growers’ value different attributes of 
marketing contracts and ii) how growers’ risk perception and preferences affect their 
selection of marketing contracts. The main data source is a mail survey administrated to 
315 wholesale tomato growers in 4 states: Kentucky, Illinois, Ohio and Indiana. Fresh 
vegetable growers were selected as the sample of the present study due to the increased 
sources of risk they face and the limited opportunities they have to reduce this 
uncertainty.  
The empirical results in line with the initial hypothesis and with previous 
literature (i.e. Hudson and Lusk; 2004, Allen and Lueck; 1995) highlight the role of 
transaction costs as an important determinant of contract choice. Specifically, the 
findings indicate that certification cost requirements (or third party audits) have a 
significant negative impact on growers’ utility concerning the selection of contracts. 
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Furthermore, the findings indicate the existence of unobserved heterogeneity regarding 
growers’ preferences for marketing contracts.  
The effect of risk on the selection of contracts is a widely discussed topic in the 
literature; however, no common consensus has been reached. The present study used a 
multiple price risk game and a number of Likert scale questions to elicit growers’ risk 
aversion and risk perception, respectively. In contrast with Hudson and Lusk (2004), the 
results indicate that growers’ risk aversion and risk preferences have a limited impact on 
growers’ selection of marketing contracts.  Last but not least, buyers who wish to enter 
into marketing contracts with growers need to provide a high early price, as well as 
improve the determination of quality criteria, thus reducing the third party audit costs. 
Future research may include larger samples and different geographic areas where 
the use of marketing contracts is more common than in the examined region. If the 
importance of third party audit cost in these regions, where growers are more familiar 
with contracts, is lower and risk perception is still a significant determinant of choices, 
then it may indicate that education can alter growers’ preferences.      
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 Figure 3.1: Example Choice Set 
 
 Please choose only one option  Option A              ↔  Option B                ↔  Option C
 
 
 
 
 Option A  Option B  Option C 
Delivery 
Period 
Price 
($/lbs) 
Volume  
(pounds/ acre/ 
week) 
Penalty Certification 
Cost 
Price 
($/lbs) 
Volume  
(pounds/ acre/ 
week) 
Penalty Certification 
Cost 
 
 
 
Early $ 0.74 2,200/acre/week 5% $1000 $0.62 2,600/acre/week 15% $500 I will not 
Choose 
either A 
or B 
Peak  
 
$ 0.53 6,000/acre/week 5% $1000 $0.55 5,000/acre/week 15% $500 
Late $ 0.70 5,100/acre/week 5% $1000 $0.77 4,300/acre/week 15% $500 
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Figure 3.2: Risk preferences elicitation question 
Please consider the choice you would make in the following hypothetical situation:  
You will be given 150 tomato plants (in 5 bundles of 30 plants each) for free, to use in 
the coming season. There are two types of plants, A and B, and you can choose any 
combination of the two that totals 5 bundles. 
The A and B plants have different levels of resistance to tomato diseases. The A plants 
have potentially higher harvests but are more vulnerable to disease. If disease does not 
occur, the A plants will produce a harvest worth $30 per bundle. However if disease 
occurs (50% of the time), the A plants’ harvest is worthless ($0 per bundle). The B plants 
are disease-resistant and always produce a harvest worth $10 per bundle. 
The following table illustrates the different combinations of type A and B plants that you 
could receive, and the value of their combined harvests based on the weather. Please 
check one box to indicate which combination of plants you would choose. 
I choose (check 
one of  the six 
combinations 
A-F below) 
Bundles of 30  
type A plants 
Bundles of 30 
type B plants 
If disease does 
not occur (50%) 
If disease 
occurs (50%) 
o A 0 5 $50 $50 
o B 1 4 $70 $40 
o C 2 3 $90 $30 
o D 3 2 $110 $20 
o E 4 1 $130 $10 
o F 5 0 $150 $0 
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Table 3.1: Registered Commercial Tomato Growers and Usable Response Rate by State 
State Registered 
Growers 
Usable  
Responses
% Usable Response Rate 
Illinois 116 17 14.6 % 
Indiana 53 12 22.6 % 
Kentucky 50 12 24.0 % 
Ohio 81 8  9.8 % 
n 300 49 16.3% 
Source: Market Maker, survey questionnaire 
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics Associated with Commercial Tomato Growers 
Variable Average Std. Min. Max. 
Gender  
(1=female) 
0.24   
(0.17)a 
0.43 0 1 
Age 49. 2  (56)a 12.43 30 70 
Experience with 
contracts (1=yes) 
0.36 0.48 0 1 
Household size 2.4 1.28 1 6 
Household income 71,480 33,169 20,000 137,500 
Education 15 2.5 5 19 
Off farm employment 
 (1= yes) 
0.42 0.49 0 1 
Acres with Tomatoes 17.5 (17)a 85.5 0.125 600 
n=49     
Source: Survey questionnaire    
a Numbers in parenthesis come from 2007 census of agriculture for vegetables,  
potatoes and melons. 
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Table 3.3: Factors that Encourage Growers Participation in Marketing Contracts  
  Importance levels (4=most important)
Factor Freq. 1 2 3 4 
Reduced price risk 29 10.3% 20.7% 31.0% 37.9% 
Secured income 39   2.6% 12.8% 41.0% 43.6% 
No need to worry about supply channels 23 26.0% 39.1%   8.7% 26.1% 
Access new market opportunities 31 25.8% 25.8% 25.8% 22.6% 
Bonuses for better quality 19 43.4% 10.5% 10.5% 10.5% 
Opportunity to sell higher volumes 30 33.3% 20.0% 20.0% 23.3% 
Prior experience with contracts 8 62.5% 12.5% 12.5%   0.0% 
Lower distribution cost 13 46.1%   7.7%   7.7% 15.4% 
Maintenance of future relationships with 
buyers 
18 44.4% 16.0% 16.7%   5.6% 
Other 2 50.0%   0.0%   0.0% 50.0% 
Source: Survey questionnaire      
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Table 3.4: Factors that Discourage Growers From Participating in Marketing Contracts 
  Importance levels (4=most important)
Factor Freq. 1 2 3 4 
Difficult to satisfy quality requirements 32 21.8% 28.1% 21.9% 28.1% 
Unhappy with price terms 28 10.7% 10.7% 32.1% 46.4% 
Severe penalties 19 15.8% 26.3% 15.8% 42.1% 
Inflexibility to pursue other markets 23 34.8% 26.1% 17.4% 21.7% 
Cost of enforcement 11   9.0% 36.4% 18.2% 36.4% 
Bad previous experience with contracts 12 25.0% 50.0% 16.7%    8.3% 
Unhappy with quality terms 19   5.3% 43.4% 26.3% 21.0% 
Delivery time 17 23.5% 41.2% 17.6% 17.6% 
Method of payment 12 50.0% 16.7% 25.0%   8.3% 
Not enough information about contracts 18 16.7% 22.2% 22.2% 38.9% 
Difficult to satisfy volume requirements 28 39.3% 14.3% 17.9% 28.6% 
Not enough land 12 33.3% 16.7% 16.7% 33.3% 
Other 1 100%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0% 
Source: Survey questionnair
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 Table 3.5: Choice Based Experiment Attributes and Their Levels 
Variable Description Levels 
  1 2 3 4 
Early Price Price offered for late June- 
Early July ($/lb) 
0.62 0.68 0.74  
Peak Price Price offered for  
July-August ($/lb) 
0.53 0.55 0.58  
Late Price Price offered for  
September – October ($/lb) 
0.70 0.77 0.84  
Early Volume Volume requirements for 
Late June- Early July 
(lbs./acre) 
2,200 2,400 2,600  
Peak Volume Volume requirements for  
July- August (lbs./acre) 
5,000 5,500 6,000  
Late Volume Volume requirements for 
September- October 
(lbs./acre) 
4,300 4,700 5,100  
Penalties  Price reduction if the 
contract agreements are not 
satisfied (% of price) 
5% 10% 15% Terminate 
Certification 
Cost 
3rd party audit cost 0 500 1000  
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Table 3.6: Main Effect Conditional and Mixed Logit Estimations 
                              Conditional Logit             Mixed Logit 
 Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient  Std. Error  
Early Price 3.546* 1.960 3.683* 2.125 
Peak Price 3.902 4.748 5.138 5.317 
Late Price 0.569 1.690 1.427 1.891 
Early Volume -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
Peak Volume 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Late Volume 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Certification Cost -0.001*** 0.000 -0.002*** 0.000 
Penalty -1.228*** 0.288 -1.44*** 0.320 
No Contract 5.140 4.34 6.50 4.909 
No Contract  S.D.   3.208*** 0.628 
McFadden R2a 0.118  0.128  
Adj. McFadden R2  0.090  0.089  
 n=49     
*, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. 
a McFadden R2 is given by one minus the ratio of unrestricted to restricted 
log likelihood values 
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Table 3.7: Marginal Values Under Mixed Logit Model 
       Early Price      Peak Price       Late Price 
 Mean Std. Errora Mean Std. Error Mean  Std. Error 
Early Volume 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Peak Volume 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Late Volume 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Certification 
Cost 
0.0004* 0.0002 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
Penalty 0.393* 0.238 0.282 0.303 1.015 1.351 
No Contract -1.8 1.4 -1.3 0.95 -5.3 6.86 
* Indicates 10% significance level 
a The standard errors are estimated using the delta method. 
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Table 3.8: The Payoffs and Corresponding Risk Classification  
Choice Low 
Payoff  
(Disease 
occurs) 
High 
Payoff (No 
disease)  
Risk  
Aversion Classa 
Approximate 
Partial Risk 
Aversion 
Coefficient 
(S) 
Percentage of 
Choices in 
Experiment 
A 50 50 Extreme ∞ to 2.48  16.3% 
B 40 70 Severe 2.48 to 0.84  22.45% 
C 30 90 Intermediate 0.84 to 0.5  34.69% 
D 20 110 Moderate 0.5 to 0.33  18.37% 
E 10 130 Slight to Neutral 0.33 to 0.19    6.12% 
F 0 150 Neutral to Negative 0.19 to -∞    2.04% 
a Based on Binswanger (1980) classification 
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Table 3.9: Growers’ Risk Perception: Response to Scale Questions 
 (-4= strongly Disagree, 4= Strongly Agree) 
Question Definition Mean 
1 With respect to the conduct of business I avoid 
taking risk 
0  
(2.00)a 
2 With respect to the conduct of business I prefer 
certainty to uncertainty 
1.5 
(1.7) 
3 
 
n=49 
I like “playing it safe” 0.8 
(1.8) 
a Number in parentheses are standard deviations 
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Table 3.10: Mixed Logit Estimations Including Growers’ Risk Perception and Risk Preferences Interaction 
 Model 1a                                    Model 2b                                          Model 3c
 Coeff. Std. 
Error 
 Coeff. Std. 
Error 
 Coeff. Std. 
Error 
Early Price 3.439 2.200 Early Price 4.049* 2.168 Early Price 2.864 2.251 
Peak Price 7.247 5.540 Peak Price 6.171 5.437 Peak Price 7.757 5.600 
Late Price 1.257 1.923 Late Price 1.739 1.917 Late Price 1.612 1.943 
Early Volume -0.000 0.000 Early Volume -0.001 0.001 Early Volume -0.000 0.000 
Early Volume* RP 0.000 0.000 Early Volume* RA 0.001 0.000 Early Volume* 
RARP 
0.000 0.000 
Peak Volume 0.000 0.000 Peak Volume 0.000 0.000 Peak Volume 0.000 0.000 
Peak Volume*RP -0.000 0.000 Peak Volume*RA -0.000 0.000 Peak 
Volume*RARP 
-0.000 0.000 
Late Volume 0.000 0.000 Late Volume 0.000 0.000 Late Volume 0.000 0.000 
Late Volume *RP 0.000 0.000 Late Volume *RA -0.000 0.000 Late Volume 
*RARP 
0.000 0.000 
Certification Cost -0.001*** 0.000 Certification Cost -0.001** 0.000 Certification Cost -0.001*** 0.000 
Certification 
Cost*RP 
-0.000** 0.000 Certification 
Cost*RA 
-0.000 0.000 Certification 
Cost*RARP 
-0.000 0.000 
Penalty -1.429*** 0.334 Penalty -0.922* 0.581 Penalty -1.455*** 0.346 
Penalty*RP -0.053 0.627 Penalty*RA -0.635 0.0559 Penalty*RARP 0.039 0.601 
No Contract 7.186 5.027 No Contract 6.774 4.997 No Contract 6.528 5.079 
No Contract S.D. 3.138*** 0.624 No Contract S.D. 3.218*** 0.629 No Contract S.D. 3.104*** 0.620 
McFadden R2d 0.14   0.139   0.148  
Adj. McFadden R2 0.089   0.082   0.009  
n=49         
*,**,*** Indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively 
a Model 1 includes interaction terms with growers risk preference levels (RP) 
b Model 2 includes interaction terms with growers risk aversion levels (RA) 
c Model 3 includes as an interaction term a combination of risk aversion and risk preference levels (RARP)   
d McFadden R2 is given by one minus the ratio of unrestricted to restricted log likelihood values 
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Table 3.11: Marginal Value Estimates Under Mixed Logit Models 
Marginal values associated with Risk Aversion (Model 2) 
 R.A.  levels Early Price 
($/pound.) 
Std.Error 
Certification Cost 0.5 0.0003* 0.0002 
 1 0.0004* 0.0002 
 2 0.0005* 0.0003 
 R.A. levels   
Penalty 0.5 0.306 0.191 
 1 0.384* 0.215 
 2 0.541* 0.315 
* Indicates statistical significance at 10% level 
 
   
Copyright © Michael Vassalos 2013
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Chapter 4: Risk Aversion and Production Uncertainty as Parameters Influencing 
Growers Marketing Choice: A Mathematical Programming Approach 
4.1 Introduction 
Following the pioneering work of Coase (1937), Cheung (1969) and Stiglitz 
(1974) numerous empirical studies have used either mathematical programming or 
econometric techniques to model growers’ choices regarding contractual agreements. The 
first group of research primarily utilized whole farm economic analysis to evaluate the 
selection of the optimal marketing mix (eg. Barry and Willmann, 1976; Buccola and 
French, 1977; Buccola and French, 1979; Miller, 1986; Bailey and Richardson, 1985). 
Studies in the second group of research used a wide variety of econometric techniques 
such as: i) limited dependent variable models (Goodwin and Schroeder, 1994; Musser et 
al., 1996; Katchova and Miranda, 2004; Sartwelle et al., 2000), ii) binary variable models 
(Paulson et al., 2010; McLeay and Zwart, 1998) and iii) discrete choice experiments 
(Hudson and Lusk, 2004). The questions that these studies answered included: i) what 
factors influence the choice of contracts, ii) how much production to sell under contracts, 
and iii) what tradeoffs are growers willing to make in order to participate in contractual 
agreements? 
Despite this abundance of research there is no general consensus of the role of 
risk aversion in contract choices. The following three possibilities have been suggested in 
previous research: 1) risk aversion is an important parameter in contract choice (i.e. 
Ackerberg and Botticini, 2002; Parcell and Langmeir, 1997; Zheng et al., 2008), 2) to a 
greater extent, it is the transaction cost or the provision of incentives that dictates the 
choice of contracts (i.e. Allen and Lueck, 1999; Allen and Lueck 1995; Predergast, 1999; 
Aggarwal, 2007) and 3) both transaction costs and risk aversion are significant 
 
69 
 
determinants of contract choice (i.e. Hudson and Lusk, 2004; Fukunaga and Huffman, 
209). 
The objective of the present study is to investigate the role of growers’ risk 
aversion in the choice of optimal marketing mix. Specifically, growers’ preferences 
between two marketing options (wholesale marketing and combination of wholesale 
marketing and marketing contracts) under ten risk aversion levels are examined.  
The contribution of the study to the literature is threefold. Specifically,  it is the 
first research endeavor, to the authors’ knowledge that:  i) utilizes integer programming 
and biophysical simulation techniques to model contract choices, ii) discusses changes in 
optimal production practices induced by the participation in a contractual agreement and 
iii) compares the results of a mathematical programming formulation with findings from 
discrete choice experiments. Specifically, the results of this study were compared with 
the findings of Vassalos et al. (2013) who used a choice experiment to examine 
wholesale tomato growers’ preferences for marketing contracts. The following sections 
provide a detailed discussion regarding the hypothetical farm of the study, the marketing 
options, the economic model and the production practices examined. 
4.2 The Hypothetical Farm 
The hypothetical vegetable farm of the study is located in Fayette County, 
Kentucky (KY). Three reasons dictated the selection of this region. First, Fayette County 
is among the top vegetable producing counties in the state. Second, Fayette County 
includes Lexington, a regional urban center with a relative large number of restaurants. 
Moreover, the increased demand for local products among wholesale buyers and 
commercial buyers indicates an opportunity to exploit marketing contracts in the area as 
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an alternative market option (Cable, 2011; Ernst and Woods, 2011). Third, there is an 
abundance of soil and weather data for Fayette County. These data are essential 
requirements for the biophysical simulation model as discussed later.  
Based on the average size of operation observed in the 2010 Kentucky Produce 
Planting and Marketing Intentions survey (Woods, 2010), the hypothetical farm is 
assumed to have five acres of cropland available and grow tomatoes and sweet corn in a 
rotation with 50% of acres in any year devoted to each crop. The choice of these 
vegetables is driven by two factors. First, in terms of acres and number of farms tomatoes 
and sweet corn are the top two vegetables produced in KY (2007 Census of Agriculture). 
Second, growers can easily rotate among these two crops (Coolong, 2010). 
The 2012 vegetable budget files of Mississippi State Budget Generator (Laughlin 
and Spurlock, 2007; Ibendhal and Halich, 2010) were modified for Fayette County (KY) 
conditions19 and used to estimate the selected variable costs. A detailed presentation of 
these costs is reported in Table 4.1. 
An important first step for the success of a commercial vegetable farm is the 
selection of a marketing channel (Rowell, Woods, Mansfield, 1999). For the purposes of 
the present study the following two marketing options are available: i) wholesale market 
or ii) a combination of marketing contracts and wholesale marketing. Detailed discussion 
for these two options is provided in the following section. 
 
 
 
                                                            
19 The required modifications were based on the 2008 vegetable budget developed by University of 
Kentucky Extension Service and on personal communication with Dr. T. Coolong. 
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4.3 Marketing Channels 
4.3.1 Wholesale Market 
Under this option, an intermediary initially buys from the grower and afterwards 
sells to a retailer or the consumer. Wholesale markets have limited legal requirements for 
the grower and there is no need for advertisement. On the other hand, the price offered is 
lower compared to other market outlets such as farmers markets. 
 To represent the wholesale marketing option, price data for tomato and sweet 
corn is obtained from the USDA Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS). The AMS 
terminal market price data set is based on vegetable sales taking place at the local 
wholesale markets for 15 major cities. The prices reported are those received by 
wholesalers for products that are of “good merchantable quality” (USDA, 2012). Prices 
from the Atlanta terminal market in proximity to Kentucky markets are used in this study. 
Specifically, the data set utilized includes 13 years (1998-2010) of weekly price 
data for yellow sweet corn and for three different sizes (medium, large, extra-large) of 
mature green tomatoes. The Hodrick and Prescott (HP) filter is used to remove the 
observed yearly trend of the price data. Following Ravn and Uhling (2002) a smoothing 
parameter (λ) of 6.25 is used. Finally, the prices were transformed to $/pound and 
$/dozen ears for tomatoes and sweet corn respectively.     
4.3.2 Contract Design 
The second marketing option available for the hypothetical grower represents a 
combination of marketing contracts for large tomatoes20 and wholesale marketing. A 
marketing contract is defined as an oral or written agreement between a grower and a 
                                                            
20 Only large tomatoes are examined in order to better imitate the conjoint experiment in Vassalos et al. 
(2013) 
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buyer (wholesaler, restaurant, grocery store, etc.) who sets some quantity/quality 
requirements, a price for the product coupled with possible price adjustments, and 
delivery period requirement (McDonald et al., 2004; Katchova and Miranda, 2004). 
Marketing contract agreements can act as a tool to coordinate the market, achieve a 
constant supply of local vegetables, and possibly improve the economic outcome of 
producers. 
Three mutually exclusive marketing contracts (contract 1, contract 2, and contract 
3) are defined for this study utilizing different levels of the following eight attributes: 
early period price, peak period price, late period price, early period volume requirements, 
peak period volume requirements, late period volume requirements, penalty and 
certification cost. Early period, refers approximately to the period up to July 10, the peak 
period covers July and August, and the late period includes September and October. 
Selection of these time periods is based on focus group discussions with buyers. 
Definitions for each attribute are reported in Table 4.2.  
The present study employs a price per pound mechanism contingent on the quality 
of the product and the delivery period. The USDA-AMS tomato prices from Atlanta 
Terminal Market are used as base prices and are modified accordingly following 
comments from focus groups. Specifically, following the feedback from the focus group, 
the examined contracts offer the highest price range levels for late period production 
($0.70 to $0.84 per pound) followed by early period production ($0.62 to $0.74 per 
pound) and peak period production ($0.53 to $0.58 per pound) . For comparison 
purposes, the average AMS prices for large tomatoes are $0.67, $0.57, $0.53 for the late, 
early and peak period respectively. 
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Regarding volume requirements, the scarcity of detailed yield data leads to the 
use of biophysical simulation techniques. Since growers do not generally contract all of 
their production (Katchova and Miranda, 2004), the volume requirements specified on 
the contract profiles correspond to 10%, 15% and 20% of the average yield calculated by 
DSSAT, evenly distributed among the three periods (early, peak and late).  
If the grower fails to satisfy the requirements of the contract then a penalty clause 
is activated. The literature examines several possible penalty structures (Wolf et al., 
2001; Hueth et al., 1999). For the purposes of the present study, the penalties are defined 
as a percentage of the full contract price. Specifically, three penalty levels are used in the 
study: 5%, 10% and 15% of the price. In line with the price determination, the final 
selection of penalty levels is made following the feedback from the focus groups. 
  The certification cost attribute refers to lump sum payments that growers have to 
provide for third party audits conducting quality control. The importance of such costs in 
the choice of contractual agreements has been mentioned earlier. Based on feedback from 
the focus groups three levels of certification cost were used: $0 (no certification cost), 
$500 and $1000. Finally, the volume requirements of the three contracts correspond to 
10%, 15% and 20% of the average yields estimated through the biophysical simulation 
model (discussed in the next section) for each of the three periods (early, peak and late).  
Contract 1 consists of a combination of the minimum values of each attribute. 
Contract 2 includes a combination of the medium levels of each one of the eight 
attributes. Finally, contract 3 incorporates a combination of the highest price, highest 
volume requirements, highest penalty levels and highest certification cost (Table 4.2). 
The selection of these combinations for the examined contracts is made in order to avoid 
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the existence of a clearly superior contract (i.e. high price, low penalties, zero 
certification cost). 
4.4 Economic Model 
The economic environment of the hypothetical wholesale vegetable farm is 
modeled with a combination of quadratic and integer programming formulation 
embodied in a mean-variance framework (E-V). Two reasons justify the use of integer 
programming (IP). First, the contractual agreements offered in the study are mutually 
exclusive and non-negotiable. This is required in order to imitate the discrete choice 
experiment environment. IP enables an efficient modeling of such constraints. Second, IP 
is a powerful and efficient tool when multiple choice sets are considered simultaneously 
(Danok et al., 1980).  
The objective of the model is the maximization of net returns above selected 
variable costs less the risk aversion coefficient multiplied by the variance of net returns. 
The risk aversion coefficients are estimated using the McCarl and Bessler (1989) 
approach. This technique assumes that a grower maximizes the lower limit from a 
confidence interval of normally distributed net returns. Based on this approach, nine 
levels of risk aversion are estimated. Each one of these levels corresponds to a 5% 
increment from the previous one starting from 50% (risk neutral) up to 95% (extreme risk 
aversion). 
Regarding the model formulation, the present essay expanded the model 
introduced in the second chapter of the dissertation to include the following additions: 
4.1 	 	 	1 
4.2 	 , , ∗ , , 	 0, ∀	 , ,  
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4.3 	 , , ∗ , , , ∀	 , ,  
4.4 	 , , 	 ∗ 	 0, ∀	 	 
4.5 	 , , 	 ∗ 	 0, ∀	 					 
4.6 , , ∗ 	 2, ∀	 				 
4.7 	 , , 	 , , 	 , ,
	 , ∗ 0	∀	 , ,  
where SATISFYYR, FAILCONTR,WK,YR, PICKCONTR are binary variables and M is a 
number larger than the highest number of pounds that can be sold under contract (Danok 
et al., 1980). SHORTAGECONTR,WK,YR is a continuous variable defined as the difference 
between the contract volume requirements for the different weeks and the large tomato 
pounds actually produced during those weeks for each of the production years examined. 
The first constraint (equation (4.1)) insures that only one, if any, contract will be 
selected. This approach enables the simulation of the choice experiment described by 
Vassalos et al. (2013)21, which is one of the objectives of the present study.  
If a contract option is selected then the grower will either 1) satisfy the weekly 
(WK) volume requirements specified by the examined contracts each production year 
(YR) or 2) fail to satisfy the volume requirements. Under the former option the grower 
will sell the required amount of tomatoes (CONTSALES) at the original contract price. 
                                                            
21 Under the choice experiment, the growers were asked to select one and only one option from three 
choices: two distinct marketing contract formulations and the option of “I will not choose any of the 
offered contracts”. 
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Under the latter case the grower will sell the amount of tomatoes produced (PENSALES) 
under a reduced penalty price. 
The aforementioned options are formulated with the use of either/or constraints 
(Equations (4.2) and (4.3)) and with the use of Boolean logical conditions specified in the 
model (Equations (4.4) and (4.5)). For instance, if  FAILCONTR,WK,YR = 0 then the 
constraint (4.3) holds and the grower will be able to meet the contract requirements.  
Marketing contracts frequently include disclaimers that allow the buyer to 
terminate the contractual agreement if the grower repeatedly fails to meet the agreed 
terms. Equation (4.6) models such a disclaimer. Specifically, it establishes that the 
contract agreement will be terminated if the grower fails to meet the requirements more 
than two weeks during that year. Lastly, equation (4.7) establishes the balance 
requirement for the contract volume. The complete mathematical formulation is 
presented at appendix B.     
In order to estimate whether a given period is suitable for fieldwork, the approach 
used in Shockley et al. (2011) is employed. Specifically, the probability of not raining 
more than 0.15 inches per day is calculated based on weather data from 1971 to 2008. 
This probability was multiplied with the days worked in a week and the hours worked in 
a day to determine expected suitable field hours per week. Daily weather data for the 38 
year period are obtained from the University of Kentucky Agricultural Weather Center. 
The model is estimated under two scenarios. In the first one, the grower is able to 
select some combination among two marketing channels: 1) wholesale marketing only 
and 2) wholesale marketing and contractual agreements (for large tomatoes). Under the 
second scenario, sensitivity analyses tests were conducted to examine the effect of price 
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alterations on the choice of marketing outlet. This approach will help to identify changes 
in economic performance production practices resulting from the participation in 
marketing contracts.  
4.5 Production Environment and Biophysical Simulation Model 
Statistical regression equations and simulation models are the two main 
techniques used in the literature to overcome yield data limitations (Walker, 1989). The 
present study employs a special case of simulation modeling known as biophysical 
simulation (Musser and Tew, 1984). Specifically, yield data for tomatoes and sweet corn 
are estimated using the Decision Support System for Agrotechnology Transfer (DSSAT 
v. 4.0) a biophysical simulation model (Hoogenboom et al., 2003; Jones et al., 2003). The 
selection of DSSAT is based on the following three reasons: i) it is well documented, ii) 
it has been validated in numerous studies over the last 15 years and iii) it incorporates 
modules for tomatoes and sweet corn. 
The minimum data requirements to generate yield estimates using DSSAT 
include: i) soil data, ii) daily weather data and iii) production practices information for 
the region and crops under consideration. These data sets are obtained from the National 
Cooperative Soil Survey of NRCS, the University of Kentucky Agricultural Weather 
Center and the University of Kentucky Extension Service Bulletins (Coolong et al., 2010) 
respectively.  
Based on the soil maps the most common soil type in Fayette County (KY) is silt 
loams with 65% of the soil classified as deep silt loams and 35% as shallow. This 
distinction is based on the percent slopes from the soil maps. Specifically, following 
Shockley (2010), soils with slopes less than 6% are characterized as shallow and soils 
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with slopes between 6% and 20% as deep. In order to better simulate the soil conditions 
of the examined region, the default soil types of DSSAT were modified. The parameters 
altered include soil color, runoff potential, drainage and soil slope. The exact soil 
specifications are reported at Table 4.3. 
The weather data set used in the study includes daily climate information 
(minimum/maximum temperature, precipitation) for 38 years (1971-2008). The data set 
was finalized with the estimation of solar radiation from the DSSAT v. 4.0 weather 
module. 
The production practices data set contains information for transplanting period 
(tomatoes), planting period (sweet corn), harvesting period, irrigation requirements, plant 
population, planting depth, fertilization requirements and cultivar types. In the examined 
region, tomato transplant extends from early May (spring crop) through early August (fall 
crop) and sweet corn is planted from April 20 to July 20. Tomatoes are typically 
harvested 65 to 80 days after transplant and sweet corn is usually harvested 70 to 95 days 
after planting. 
4.5.1 Yield Estimates and Validation 
Yield estimation for all the possible combinations of transplanting/planting and 
harvesting periods requires coding of more than 9500 treatments22 in DSSAT which is 
beyond the scope and objectives of the present essay. In order to reduce the number of 
treatments, the examined production practices include eight bi-weekly transplanting days 
for tomatoes (starting May 1), nine weekly planting days for sweet corn (starting April 
                                                            
22 ((120 transplanting days* 15 harvesting days for tomatoes)+(120 planting days *25 harvesting days for 
sweet corn)*2 for the 2 soil types  
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25) and four weekly harvest periods for each crop. One cultivar is examined for each crop 
since only one is available in DSSAT v 4.0. 
One of the most important aspects in biophysical simulation modeling is the 
validation of the estimated yields. Considering the lack of yield data in the examined 
region (Fayette County, KY) the following two non-statistical validation methods are 
employed: i) expert’s opinion and ii) comparison with findings from previous studies.  
Specifically, for the former approach, the initial yield estimations were presented 
to Dr. Timothy Coolong23 and he was asked whether or not they were a reasonable 
representation of yields in Central Kentucky for tomatoes and sweet corn. Following Dr. 
Coolong’s recommendations, three harvesting periods for tomatoes (63, 70, 77 days) and 
one for sweet corn (84 days) are kept in the final model formulations. The simulated 
yields were considered as higher than what an average vegetable grower can achieve but 
not unreasonable for the best producers. Yields estimated for harvesting periods 84 days 
after transplanting for tomatoes and 70, 77 and 91 days after planting for sweet corn are 
removed from the yield data set since they were considered as not achievable in the 
examined area.  Tables 4.4 and 4.5 provide detailed information regarding the production 
practices examined and summary statistics for the simulated yields respectively.  
For the latter approach trends observed in previous research were compared with 
trends in the simulated yield data set. As such, in line with Hossain et al. (2004), 
Huevelink (1999) and Schweers and Grimes (1976), the simulated tomato yields had 
approximately a bell shaped form and are substantially influenced by the transplanting 
period (Figure 4.1). Regarding sweet corn, consistent with Williams (2008) and Williams 
and Linquist (2007) planting period plays an important role in production (Figure 4.2).  
                                                            
23 Extension Vegetable Specialist, Assistant Extension Professor, University of Kentucky 
 
80 
 
Since the weather conditions and soil data in Fayette County (KY) are different 
from the ones in the previously mentioned studies, absolute yield values are not 
compared. However, in order to provide further validation, the simulated yields for 
tomatoes and sweet corn are compared with experimental trials that conducted in Central 
and Eastern Kentucky. For tomatoes, the simulated yields compare favorably to the 
highest yielding cultivars in the experimental trials (Rowell et al., 2004; Rowell et al., 
2005; Rowell et al., 2006; Coolong et al., 2009). Regarding sweet corn, the average 
simulated yields are slightly lower than the best yellow cultivar of the experimental trials 
((Jones and Sears, 2005).      
4.6 Results 
The findings of the mathematical programming formulation indicate that 
wholesale marketing is preferred, over a combination of wholesale marketing and 
marketing contracts, for all risk aversion levels (Table 4.6). This result are in line with 
Vassalos et al. (2013) who illustrated that, on average, wholesale growers do not suffer 
utility loss if a contract option is not available to them. The primary reason for not 
selecting a mix of wholesale marketing and contracts lies in the yield losses associated 
with the earlier production, required by a marketing contract agreement (Figure 4.1). In 
agreement with the underlying theory, as risk aversion levels increase growers’ trade off 
expected net returns for lower variance. For instance, the net returns for an extremely risk 
averse grower (level 9) correspond to 80% of the maximum possible net returns coupled 
with a reduction in coefficient of variation (C.V.) from 24.52% to 16.18% (Table 6). 
Compared to other agronomic crops, fresh vegetables have fewer storage 
opportunities and therefore an inelastic supply at a given time period. Consequently, in 
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order to satisfy the requirements of the selected market outlet and achieve the optimal 
economic outcome growers have to carefully plan their planting and harvesting activities.  
Table 4.7 reports the optimal production schedule and land allocation for four of 
the examined risk aversion levels. The findings indicate that the optimal schedule for a 
risk neutral grower, seeking to maximize net returns, includes a combination of late 
transplanting/harvesting period for tomatoes and late planting for sweet corn. 
Specifically, July 10 and July 24 are selected as optimal transplanting periods for 
tomatoes and June 21 as optimal planting for sweet corn. Regarding tomato harvesting, 
77 days after transplant is the time selected as optimal (Table 4.7). All the available five 
acres are utilized.  
The following three alterations are adopted as risk aversion levels increase: 1) 
gradually shift focus towards earlier transplanting periods for tomatoes (June 12 instead 
of July 10), 2) earlier planting for sweet corn (from June 21 to May 23) and 3) expand the 
number of optimal transplanting periods from two to three for the highest risk aversion 
level level (Table 4.7). These strategies help to reduce the variation in net returns, which 
is an objective for risk averse growers. The reduction in C.V. results from a reduced price 
variation. Specifically, the price coefficient of variation drops from 19% (July 24, 77 
days harvest) to 10% (June 12, 77 days harvest). Similarly to the risk neutral case, all five 
acres are utilized.   
The results from Vassalos et al. (2013) indicated that growers are more likely to 
participate in a marketing contract agreement if the early price offered is higher. 
Consequently, an intriguing research question is to examine the impact of higher contract 
prices, ceteris paribus, on the choice of optimal marketing outlet in the mathematical 
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programing framework. In order to answer this question sensitivity analyses were 
conducted. Specifically, for the risk neutral case, the following four scenarios are 
examined: i) increase only in the early period price, ii) increase only in the peak period 
price, iii) increase only in the late period price and iv) increase all prices simultaneously. 
The findings indicate that the combination of wholesale and marketing contracts is 
preferred, for the first time, when all three prices increase simultaneously by 70%. The 
contract selected as optimal under this scenario is contract 3.  
If the model formulation “enforces” participation in a marketing contract 
agreement, by increasing the contract prices, then the optimal production practices are 
significantly altered compared to those under only wholesale marketing. Specifically, two 
major changes occur under this scenario for a risk neutral grower: 1) Harvesting 70 and 
77 days after transplanting is preferred, instead of after 77 days only and 2) transplanting 
occurs all eight of the examined weeks between May 1 and August 7 (Table 4.8). 
However, transplanting at July 10 and harvesting 77 days later is still the period with the 
greater number of acres with tomatoes. No alteration is realized for sweet corn production 
practices (Table 4.8). The aforementioned changes are required in order to satisfy the 
volume requirements of the contract and receive the higher prices. 
4.7 Conclusions 
The present study employed a whole farm modeling approach to investigate 
optimal marketing strategies for fresh vegetable growers, under different risk aversion 
levels. Specifically, a combination of integer and quadratic programming are used to 
model the economic environment of a vegetable farm located at Fayette County, 
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Kentucky. Two marketing options, wholesale marketing only and a combination of 
wholesale marketing with marketing contracts, are examined.  
The former approach is characterized by greater volatility in prices, but provides 
increased freedom to the grower regarding the choice of production practices. The latter 
option provides higher and more stable prices but requires constant production 
throughout the year, additional cost in the form of third party audits and reduced yield 
compared to wholesale marketing only. 
The findings of the study indicated that wholesale marketing is preferred over a 
combination of wholesales and marketing contracts. Risk aversion levels influenced the 
selection of optimal production practices but not the choice of marketing outlet. 
Furthermore, findings from a sensitivity analysis illustrated that when all three contract 
prices (early, peak, late) are increased simultaneously, from the base price scenario, a risk 
neutral grower will prefer the combination of wholesale marketing and contracts over 
only wholesale marketing. 
When the grower selects a combination of wholesale marketing and contractual 
agreements as a market outlet two main changes in production practices are noticed 
compared to wholesale marketing only. First, transplanting dates cover the whole period 
allowed. Second, harvesting occurs during multiple time periods. 
The findings of the study may act as a guide for the growers. In particular, the 
results highlight the importance of a carefully scheduled production plan in order to 
achieve the best possible economic outcome for commercial fresh vegetable production.  
Limitations of this study are related with the use of biophysical simulation 
modeling to overcome yield data limitations. Specifically, DSSAT v 4.0 includes only 
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one variety for tomatoes and sweet corn that are not commonly used in Kentucky. 
Finally, future work may investigate how the results change if i) the model is utilized in 
areas where marketing contracts are a more common practice, or, ii) with the inclusion of 
a farmers’ market option if the required price data are available.      
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Figure 4.1: Simulated Tomato Yields24 
 
        Source: Biophysical simulation results 
                                                            
24 The graph depicts average tomato yields across years and soil types 
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          Figure 4.2: Sweet Corn Yields25 
 
              Source: Biophysical Simulation Results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                            
25 The graph depicts average sweet corn yields across years and soil types. Harvesting period is 84 days 
after planting. 
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Table 4.1: Production Costs per Acre  
Tomato Expenses  Sweet Corn Expenses 
Type of Expense  Cost ($)  Type of Expense   Cost($) 
Fertilizer    319.67  Fertilizer  194.16 
Herbicide        2.33  Herbicide    21.16 
Insecticide      97.47  Insecticide  208.10 
Seed &  planting supplies  1575.08  Seed &  planting supplies  126.00 
Labor  3688.26  Labor  116.58 
Machinery expenses    139.69  Machinery expenses    66.76 
Other expenses (i.e. boxes)  1600.00  Other expenses (i.e. crates)  580.00 
Interest on capital      76.00  Interest on capital    10.58 
Irrigation supplies    627.00  Irrigation supplies   410.00 
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Table 4.2: Contract Attributes and their Levels 
Variable Description Levels 
  1 2 3 
Early Price Price offered for late June- 
Early July ($/lb) 
0.62 0.68 0.74 
Peak Price Price offered for  
July-August ($/lb) 
0.53 0.55 0.58 
Late Price Price offered for  
September – October ($/lb) 
0.70 0.77 0.84 
Early Volume Volume requirements for 
Late June- Early July 
(lbs./week) 
323 353 382 
Peak Volume Volume requirements for  
July- August (lbs./week) 
753 809 882 
Late Volume Volume requirements for 
September- October 
(lbs./week) 
632 691 735 
Penalties  Price reduction if the 
contract agreements are not 
satisfied (% of price) 
5% 10% 15% 
Certification 
Cost 
3rd party audit cost ($) 0 500 1000 
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Table 4.3: Soil Characteristics 
Soil Color Drainage Runoff 
Potential 
Slope 
(%) 
Runoff 
Curve # 
Albedo Drainage 
rate 
Deep Silty 
Loam 
(65%) 
Brown Moderately 
Well 
Lowest 3 64 0.12 0.4 
Shallow 
Silty Loam 
(35%) 
Brown Somewhat 
Poor 
Moderately 
Low 
9 80 0.12 0.2 
Source: Shockley, 2010 
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Table 4.4: Summary of Production Practices Used in the Biophysical Simulation Model 
1) Tomato Production Practices 
Transplanting date May 1, May 15, May 29, June 12, June 26, 
July 10, July 24, August 7 
Harvesting period 63, 70, 77 days after transplant  
Cultivar BHN 66 
Actual N/week (lbs/acre) 10 
Irrigation Drip irrigation, 1 inch water/week 
Plant population (plants/acre) 5,000 
Transplant age 42 days 
Planting depth 2.5 inches  
Assumptions Dry Matter = 6%, Cull ratio = 20% 
2) Sweet Corn Production Practices 
Planting date April 25, May 2, May 9, May 16, May 23, 
May 30, June 7, June 14, June 28 
Harvesting period 84 days after planting 
Cultivar Sweet corn cultivar of DSSAT v. 4 
Actual N/week 2 applications of Ammonium Nitrate. One 
pre-plant ( 90 lb. actual N/acre) and a 
second 4 weeks after planting (50 lb. actual 
N/acre) 
Irrigation Drip irrigation, 1 inch water/week 
Plant population (plants/acre) 20,000 
Planting depth 
Assumptions 
2 inches 
Dry matter =24%, Cull ratio= 3%, Ear 
weight = 0.661 pounds 
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Table 4.5: Summary Statistics26 
Tomato Yields by Size (simulated) 
 Medium Large Extra Large 
Average (pounds/acre)  6,580 26,321 10,967 
Standard Deviation 1,976.92 7,907.67 3,294.86 
Coefficient of Variation 30.00 30.00 30.00 
Maximum Yield 10,425 41,700 17,375 
Minimum Yield 0 0 0 
Tomato Prices 
 Medium Large Extra Large 
Average ($/25 pound boxes) $15.04 $15.56 $16.31 
Standard Deviation   3.12   3.48   3.84 
Coefficient of Variation 20.00 22.00 23.00 
Maximum Price ($/25 pound 
box) 
29.55 30.58 30.70 
Minimum Price ($/25 pound box)   8.99   9.77   9.68 
Sweet Corn Yield (simulated, one size) 
Average (ears/acre) 12,687 
Standard Deviation 6,140 
Coefficient of Variation 47.00 
Maximum Yield 28,579 
Minimum Yield 903 
Sweet Corn Price  
Average ($/crate) $13.04 
Standard Deviation   3.94 
Coefficient of Variation 30.00 
Maximum Price($/crate) 33.78 
Minimum Price($/crate)   6.56 
Source: DSSAT model yield results, Atlanta Agricultural Market Station prices 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
26 The maximum and minimum yields reported on the table refer to different production practices, thus 
one is not expected to add the maximum yield of medium, large and extra‐large to obtain maximum yield 
per acre 
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Table 4.6: Net Returns Above Variable Costs 
Risk Levelsa Optimal 
Market Outlet 
Mean Net 
returns 
% of Max. 
net returns 
Standard 
Deviation 
Coefficient of 
Variation (%) 
Risk neutral Wholesale 85,382 100  % 20939 24.52 
1 (z= 55%) Wholesale 85,288 99.8 % 20747 24.33 
2 (z= 60%) Wholesale 83,779 98.0 % 18452 22.02 
3 (z= 65%) Wholesale 82,301 96.2 % 16914 20.55 
4 (z= 70%) Wholesale 80,066 93.3 % 15363 19.19 
5 (z= 75%) Wholesale 78,001 90.5 % 14120 18.10 
6 (z= 80%) Wholesale 76,581 88.5 % 13399 17.50 
7 (z= 85%) Wholesale 75,200 86.4 % 12816 17.04 
8 (z= 90%)  Wholesale 73,231 83.4 % 12098 16.52 
9 (z= 95%) Wholesale 71,591 80.7 % 11581 16.18 
a Following McCarl and Bessler (1989), under the assumption of normal distribution, 
the risk levels are given by: r(X)= 2za/σy  
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Table 4.7: Summary of Optimal Production Practices by Risk Attitude 
 Tomatoes27 Sweet Corn 
Risk  
Levels 
Transplanting 
 Date 
Acres (% of total) Planting 
Day 
Acres (% of total) 
DSL SSL DSL SSL 
Risk Neutral July 10 27.0%  14.7% June 21 32.5% 17.5% 
 July 24   5.2%    2.8%    
3 (z=65%) June 12   5.4%    3.0% May 23 32.5% 17.5% 
 July 10 27.0%  14.6%    
5 (z= 75%) June 12 16.6%    9.0% May 23 32.5% 17.5% 
 July 10 16.0%    8.6%    
7 (z=85%) June 12 23.0%  12.4% May 23 32.5% 17.5% 
 July 10   8.4%    4.4%    
 July 24   1.2%    0.6%    
 
  
                                                            
27 Optimal harvesting period for tomatoes, for all the risk aversion levels and for both models, is 77 days 
after transplanting. 
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Table 4.8: Production Practices Under Contract (Risk Neutral Only) 
Tomatoes Sweet Corn 
Transplanting 
Date  
Harvesting 
Period 
Acres (% of total) 
DSL           SSL  
Planting 
Day 
Acres (% of total) 
DSL      SSL 
May 1 70   0.32 0.18 June 21 32.5% 17.5% 
May 15 70   0.52 0.28    
May 29 70   0.48 0.26    
June 12 70   0.44 0.24    
June 26 70   0.42 0.22    
July 10 70   0.38 0.20    
July 24 70   0.40 0.22    
August 7 70   0.68 0.36    
May 1 77   0.24 0.12    
May 15 77   0.42 0.22    
May 29 77   0.38 0.20    
June 12 77   0.38 0.20    
June 26 77   0.36 0.20    
July 10 77 26.74 14.4    
July 24 77   0.36 0.18    
August 7 77      
 
Copyright © Michael Vassalos 2013
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Chapter 5: Conclusions and Future Work 
The present dissertation combined mathematical programming and discrete choice 
experiment techniques in a three essays format to investigate: 1) fresh vegetable growers’ 
choice of optimal production practices and market outlet under different risk aversion 
levels, ii) the impact of season price versus annual price trend consideration on the 
optimal choice and iii) growers’ preferences for marketing contracts. 
Four main data sets are used to achieve the research objectives. First, biophysical 
simulation modeling is employed to overcome yield data limitations. This approach 
facilitated the development of an extensive data set, for tomatoes and sweet corn, that 
includes yield information for different production practices, soil and weather conditions. 
Second, primary data are used to evaluate growers’ preferences for marketing contracts. 
Third, the required price data for the analysis are obtained from the USDA agricultural 
market stations (Atlanta). Lastly, production practice data (for example tomato 
transplanting periods, sweet corn planting periods, and fertilizer requirements) are 
obtained from University of Kentucky Extension Service production guideline bulletins. 
The contribution of this dissertation to the literature is threefold. Specifically, it is 
the first research endeavor that: i) examines the interaction among production practices, 
market timing and risk aversion for vegetable production, ii) investigates growers’ 
preferences for marketing contracts as well as the effect of risk perception on the contract 
choices and iii) employs biophysical simulation for an economic study on vegetables. 
 The second chapter of the dissertation investigates the role of risk aversion and 
price distribution knowledge on the choice of optimal production practices for a 
hypothetical wholesale vegetable grower in Fayette County, Kentucky. Two scenarios are 
examined: 1) the grower considers seasonal price trends and 2) the grower considers only 
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annual price trends. Quadratic programming formulation, embodied in a mean-variance 
framework, is used to model the economic environment of the hypothetical farm. This 
approach enabled consideration of competition among resources for the two crops 
(tomatoes and sweet corn) and permited the examination of ten different risk aversion 
levels.  
The findings indicate that a risk neutral grower, aiming to maximize net returns, 
should primarily focus on late production both for sweet corn and tomatoes (June 21 and 
July 10 respectively). As the risk aversion level increases a couple of alterations in 
production practices are highlighted to reduce growers’ risk exposure. First, growers’ 
should shift focus to earlier planting/transplanting periods, and thus earlier marketing 
periods. Second, for high risk averse growers, the number of optimal transplanting 
periods is increased (from two to three). Moreover, in line with the initial expectations, 
the findings indicate that if the grower knows considers seasonal price variation then 
he/she can substantially improve the expected net returns and better manage risk. 
Besides modifying production practices, growers can mitigate risk with 
participation in marketing outlets that offer more stable prices throughout the season 
compared to a wholesale only option. An example of such an outlet is the use of 
marketing contract agreements. Despite the very rich literature regarding factors affecting 
participation in contracts (i.e., age, education, etc.) the research regarding growers’ 
preferences for marketing or productions contracts is rather limited. 
The third chapter of the dissertation is an effort to fill this gap. Specifically, with 
the use of a discrete choice experiment, the manuscript identifies fresh vegetable 
growers’ preferences for eight marketing contract attributes and the role of risk 
 
97 
 
perception as well as the role of risk preferences in the choice of contracts. The attributes 
examined are early period price, late period price, peak period price, early period volume 
requirements, peak period volume requirements, late period volume requirements, 
penalty and certification cost.  
The main data set used in the manuscript is obtained from a mail survey 
administrated to 315 wholesale tomato growers in Kentucky, Illinois, Ohio and Indiana. 
Conditional logit and mixed logit models are used to analyze preferences. Both models 
indicate that growers prefer contracts with higher early price offered coupled with lower 
penalties and certification cost. The mixed logit formulation revealed that, on average, 
growers do not suffer from utility loss if they do not have a contract choice offered. 
However, the results also indicate heterogeneity in preferences among growers. Lastly, 
the findings indicate that risk aversion and risk preferences have a minimal impact on the 
choice of contract agreements. 
Chapter four combines the previous two chapters. Specifically, the model 
formulation of chapter two is extended, with the use of integer programing, in order to 
enable the inclusion of a combination of wholesale marketing and marketing contracts as 
an alternative to wholesale only. Three marketing contracts and ten risk aversion levels 
are examined. The findings indicate that, irrespectively of risk aversion, wholesale 
marketing is preferred over the combination of wholesale marketing and marketing 
contracts. Although risk aversion levels do not influence the choice of marketing outlet, 
the findings indicate that they affect the choice of optimal production practices. This 
finding is in line with the results of the second chapter. Furthermore, sensitivity analyses 
findings illustrated that a combination of wholesale marketing and marketing contracts is 
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preferred when the prices for all periods (early, peak, and late) are increased. This finding 
differs from the results in chapter 3 indicating that growers prefer contracts with higher 
early price.   
In summary, the findings of the dissertation provide valuable insights both to 
growers and to buyers. More precisely, the results identified critical aspects that can help 
mitigate the risk associated with fresh vegetable production and achieve the optimal 
economic outcome. For instance, consideration of seasonal price information and 
appropriate selection of production timing, based on the risk levels of the grower, are two 
of these factors. Furthermore, the information regarding growers’ preferences for 
marketing contracts can be utilized by buyers in order to create contracts that can attract 
greater participation of growers.  
As far as future research endeavors are concerned, a number of possibilities exist. 
First, if the required price data sets are available, inclusion of additional marketing 
options (i.e. farmers’ market, CSA marketing, etc.) can be incorporated in the model to 
examine how growers’ optimal marketing decisions are modified. Furthermore, the 
findings of the study can be compared with either choice experiments or mathematical 
programming formulations examining preferences for locations where marketing 
contracts are more commonly used and fresh vegetable farming is more popular. Lastly, 
an intriguing topic may be the inclusion of more than two crops in the examined model 
formulations. 
Last but not least, without doubt there will be errors, omissions and over-
simplifications for which I take absolute responsibility, while hoping that the rest of the 
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material will be enough to stimulate new trains of thought into the economics of fresh 
vegetable production and marketing.   
Copyright © Michael Vassalos 2013 
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Appendices  
Appendix 1: Survey Questionnaire  
University Of Kentucky 
Tomato Marketing Study 
 
 
      
 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this research. In this survey, we are interested in 
your opinions and choices of possible marketing contracts for fresh tomatoes. You will 
need about 15-20 minutes to complete the survey. We appreciate your time. 
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 We would like to start the survey by learning about the characteristics of your farm. The 
person who answers the survey should be the one that is primarily involved in the 
management of the farm.  
A1. Where is your farm business located?  State: ____________  
County: _________ 
   Zip Code: _______ 
A2. What is your total farm size? 
 0.1 to 0.9 acres 
 1 to 4.9 acres 
 5 to 14.9 acres 
 15 to 24.9 acres 
 25 to 49.9 acres 
 50 to 99.9 acres 
 More than 100 acres 
 
A3. How many acres are dedicated to field grown production? 
 0.1 to 0.9 acres 
 1 to 4.9 acres 
 5 to 14.9 acres 
 15 to 24.9 acres 
 25 to 49.9 acres 
 50 to 99.9 acres 
 More than 100 acres 
 
A4. Are you involved with any greenhouse or protected tomato production? 
 No  Yes 
 
A5. Are you in a position to expand your operation to grow more tomatoes if the right 
opportunity came along? 
 No  Yes 
 
A6. Over the last three years, your tomato production has: 
 Decreased  Stayed the 
same 
 Increased 
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A7.Do you have experience growing grain crops? 
 No  Yes 
 
A8. What marketing channel(s) are you using for your vegetable crops (check all that 
apply)? 
 Direct marketing (i.e. farmer’s market, on farm sales, CSA’s, u-pick etc.) 
 Local Wholesalers (i.e. local grocers, DSDs or restaurants) 
 Regional Wholesalers (i.e. chain store distribution centers, terminal markets, 
brokers etc.) 
 Marketing Cooperatives 
 Produce Auctions 
 Other  ______________________ 
 
A9. For the field grown tomatoes on your farm, please provide the following information 
Acres with field grown tomatoes: ______________acres 
Average yield (lbs. /acre or # of 25 pound boxes) the last 3 years: 
_________________(units) 
Typical transplanting periods (dd/mm):  _____________________ 
          _____________________  
             _____________________ 
     ______________________ 
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Now, we would like to know a bit more about your perception and your experience with 
marketing contracts.  
      Marketing contracts, in the context of this survey, refer to a written agreement 
between a producer and a buyer that sets a price and possible price adjustments (i.e. 
penalties for bad quality) as well as an outlet for the vegetables produced before harvest 
or before the commodity is ready to be marketed. The grower assumes all risk related to 
amount produced, but shares risk related to market price with the buyer. 
 
B1. Have you ever participated in a marketing contract agreement for any kind of 
agricultural product? 
 
 No  Yes 
 
B2.  Would you be interested in participating in produce marketing contract agreements? 
 No  Maybe, depending on the 
terms 
 
 Yes  
 
B3. Please, rank the top four reasons that would encourage you to use a marketing 
contract (1= the least important and 4 = the most important reason) 
____ Reduce price risk ____Opportunity to sell higher volume 
    ____ Secure income  ____ Prior experience with contracts 
____ No need to worry about supply 
channels  
____ Lower distribution cost 
____ Access new market opportunities ____ Maintenance of future relationship 
with buyers 
    ____ Bonuses for better quality ____ Other (Specify): 
_____________________ 
 
B4. Please, rank the top four reasons that would discourage you from using marketing 
contracts for your vegetable production (1= the least important and 4= the most important 
reason)  
 
____ Difficult to satisfy quality 
requirements 
____ Unhappy with the quality terms 
____ Unhappy with the price terms ____ Delivery time 
____ Severe penalties  ____ Method of payment 
____ Inflexibility to pursue other markets ____ Not enough information about 
contracts 
____ Cost of enforcement  ____ Difficult to satisfy volume 
requirements 
____ “Bad” previous experience 
____ Other: (Specify)_________ 
____ Not enough land  
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C1. With the following questions we would like to learn a bit more about your risk 
comfort levels. 
Please consider the choice you would make in the following hypothetical situation:  
You will be given 150 tomato plants (in 5 bundles of 30 plants each) for free, to use in 
the coming season. There are two types of plants, A and B, and you can choose any 
combination of the two that totals 5 bundles. 
The A and B plants have different levels of resistance to tomato diseases. The A plants 
have potentially higher harvests but are more vulnerable to disease. If disease does not 
occur, the A plants will produce a harvest worth $30 per bundle. However if disease 
occurs (50% of the time), the A plants’ harvest is worthless ($0 per bundle). The B plants 
are disease-resistant and always produce a harvest worth $10 per bundle. 
The following table illustrates the different combinations of type A and B plants that you 
could receive, and the value of their combined harvests based on the weather. Please 
check one box to indicate which combination of plants you would choose. 
I choose (check 
one of  the six 
combinations 
A-F below) 
Bundles of 30  
type A plants 
Bundles of 30 
type B plants 
If disease does 
not occur (50%) 
If disease 
occurs (50%) 
o A 0 5 $50 $50 
o B 1 4 $70 $40 
o C 2 3 $90 $30 
o D 3 2 $110 $20 
o E 4 1 $130 $10 
o F 5 0 $150 $0 
 
C2. With respect to the conduct of business, I avoid taking risk (select one): 
I strongly disagree        I Strongly Agree 
o -4 o -3 o -2 o -1 o 0 o 1 o 2 o 3 o 4 
 
 
C3. With respect to the conduct of business, I prefer certainty to uncertainty (select one): 
I strongly disagree        I Strongly Agree
o -4 o -3 o -2 o -1 o 0 o 1 o 2 o 3 o 4 
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C4. I like “playing it safe” (select one): 
I strongly disagree        I Strongly Agree
o -4 o -3 o -2 o -1 o 0 o 1 o 2 o 3 o 4 
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Suppose you have the opportunity to enter a marketing contract agreement for fresh 
tomatoes. In the following choice situations you will be presented with a series of options 
for marketing contracts. Each choice situation contains three options described by their 
characteristics. Please select the option that is better for you. Please, bear in mind that: 
 
 Please choose ONLY ONE OPTION in each situation 
 Marketing contracts A and B given in each situation are identical in all other 
features not specifically listed 
 Assume that the options in EACH situation are the ONLY ones available 
 Do NOT compare options in different situations 
 
In the following six choice situations you will be considering marketing contracts for 
Large Tomatoes US #1. Average Prices from Agricultural Market Service (Atlanta 
Terminal Market) for the period 1998-2010 were: $ 0.54/lb for June, $0.53 for July- 
August and $0.64 for September- October.  
 
Delivery Period:  1) early refers to late June early July (approximately 3 weeks up until 
4th of July), peak period refers to July and August (approximately 8 week period) and, 3) 
late refers to September and October (approximately 8 week period).   
 
Penalties refer to price reduction in case that the producer fails to deliver the agreed 
volume and quality. The terminate contract option means that the contract is no longer 
valid and the producer has to sell the production in the spot market   
 
Options A and B correspond to two different possibilities of marketing contract 
arrangements. Under the no contract option the producer will receive market price. 
 
Certification Cost refers to a dollar amount that the producer has to pay to a third agency 
that will verify the quality of production (3rd party audit). 
 
Once again, suppose you are making these choices in real life. Please, try to select the 
options that would be closest to what you would do in real life. 
 
 
1
0
7
 
 
 
SITUATION 128 
 Contract A  Contract B  No 
Contract 
Delivery 
Period 
Price / 
Pound 
Volume 
(pounds/ acre/ 
week) 
Penalty Certification 
Cost 
Price / 
Pound 
Volume 
(pounds/ acre/ 
week) 
Penalty Certification 
Cost 
 
 
I will  
not 
Choose 
either A 
or B 
Early $ 0.62 2,200/acre/week Terminate29 $0 $ 0.74 2,600/acre/week 5% $1000 
Peak 
 
$ 0.55 5,500/acre/week Terminate $0 $0.53 6,000/acre/week 5% $1000 
Late $ 0.70 5,100/acre/week Terminate $0 $0.77 4,300/acre/week 5% $1000 
 
Please choose only one 
option:                           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
28 Penalties refer to a price reduction if the producer fails to deliver the required quantity/ quality of tomatoes  
29 Terminate contract means that the contract will no longer be valid if the grower fails to deliver the required quality/quantity of tomatoes. Thus, 
production will be sold in the spot market  
 Contract A    Contract B  No Contract 
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SITUATION 2 
 Contract A  Contract B  No 
Contract 
Delivery 
Period 
Price / 
Pound 
Volume  
(pounds/ acre/ week)
Penalty Certification 
Cost 
Price 
/ 
Pound 
Volume  
(pounds/ acre/ 
week) 
Penalty Certification 
Cost 
 
 
I will not 
Choose 
either A 
or B 
Early $ 0.62 2,400/acre/week Terminate $1000 $0.74 2,200/acre/week 15% $500 
Peak  
 
$ 0.53 5,500/acre/week Terminate $1000 $0.55 5,000/acre/week 15% $500 
Late $ 0.77 5,100/acre/week Terminate $1000 $0.70 4,700/acre/week 15% $500 
 
Please choose only one 
option:                          
 
SITUATION 3 
 Contract A  Contract B  No 
Contract 
Delivery 
Period 
Price / Pound Volume  
(pounds/ acre/ 
week) 
Penalty Certification 
Cost 
Price 
/ 
Pound 
Volume  
(pounds/ acre/ 
week) 
Penalty Certification 
Cost 
 
 
I will not 
Choose 
either A 
or B 
Early $ 0.74 2,200/acre/week 5% $1000 $0.62 2,600/acre/week 15% $500 
Peak  
 
$ 0.53 6,000/acre/week 5% $1000 $0.55 5,000/acre/week 15% $500 
Late $ 0.70 5,100/acre/week 5% $1000 $0.77 4,300/acre/week 15% $500 
 
Please choose only one 
option:           
 Contract A    Contract B  No Contract 
 Contract A    Contract B  No Contract 
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SITUATION 4 
 Contract A  Contract B  No 
Contract 
Delivery Period Price / 
Pound 
Volume  
(pounds/ acre/ 
week) 
Penalty Certification 
Cost 
Price 
/ 
Pound 
Volume  
(pounds/ acre/ 
week) 
Penalty Certification 
Cost 
 
 
I will not 
Choose 
either A 
or B 
Early $ 0.68 2,400/acre/week 10% $500 $0.62 2,600/acre/week 15% $1000 
Peak  
 
$ 0.55 6,000/acre/week 10% $500 $0.53 5,500/acre/week 15% $1000 
Late $ 0.77 5,100/acre/week 10% $500 $0.84 4,300/acre/week 15% $1000 
 
  Please choose only one option:       
                   
SITUATION 5 
 Contract A  Contract B  No 
Contract 
Delivery 
Period 
Price / 
Pound 
Volume  
(pounds/ acre/ 
week) 
Penalty Certification 
Cost 
Price 
/ 
Pound 
Volume  
(pounds/ acre/ 
week) 
Penalty Certification 
Cost 
 
 
I will not 
Choose 
either A 
or B 
Early $ 0.68 2,600/acre/week Terminate $1000 $0.62 2,200/acre/week 5% $ 0 
Peak  
 
$ 0.53 5,000/acre/week Terminate $1000 $0.58 6,000/acre/week 5% $ 0 
Late $ 0.70 4,700/acre/week Terminate $1000 $0.84 4,300/acre/week 5% $ 0 
 
 Please choose only one option:        
                    
 Contract A    Contract B  No Contract 
 Contract A    Contract B  No Contract 
 
 
1
1
0
 
 
SITUATION 6 
 Contract A  Contract B  No 
Contract 
Delivery Period Price / 
Pound 
Volume  
(pounds/ acre/ 
week) 
Penalty Certification 
Cost 
Price 
/ 
Pound 
Volume  
(pounds/ acre/ 
week) 
Penalty Certification 
Cost 
 
 
I will not 
Choose 
either A 
or B 
Early $ 0.68 2,600/acre/week Terminate $1000 $0.74 2,400/acre/week 10% $1000 
Peak  
 
$ 0.58 6,000/acre/week Terminate $1000 $0.58 5,500/acre/week 10% $1000 
Late $ 0.84 4,300/acre/week Terminate $1000 $0.70 4,700/acre/week 10% $1000 
 
Please choose only one option:         
                   
 Contract A    Contract B  No Contract 
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Finally, we would like to know a bit more about you 
 
D1.  Gender: 
 Male                                   
  Female 
 
D2. Age Group: 
 15-
25 
 26-
35 
 36-
45 
 46-
55 
 56-
65 
 66+ 
 
D3. What is your annual household income?  
 Under $ 15,000  $ 50,000 – 74,999 
 $ 15,000 - $ 24,999  $ 75,000 – 99,999 
 $ 25,000 - $34,999  $ 100,000 - $125,000 
 $ 35,000 - $49,999  Above $ 125,000 
    
D4. What percentage of your household income is your farm income?  
 Under 10%  50%-90% 
 10%-20%  More than 90% 
 20%-50% 
 
D5. What is your education level? 
 Some classes of primary school  Graduated high school 
 Completed primary school  Completed technical school 
 Some classes of secondary school  Some college no degree 
 Completed secondary school  Completed college 
 Some classes of high school  Completed graduate school 
 
D6. How many members are in the household, including you? ___________ 
 
D7. Are there any children under 18 in your household?  
Yes  No 
 
D8. What is your current marital status?  
 Married  Widow/widow
er 
 Divorce
d 
 Separated  Never Married 
 
D10. Do you have off farm employment?  
 No    Yes, but less than my farm 
income 
 Yes, more than my farm income 
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Thank You!! 
Please use the following space to express any comments/ questions you may have about 
the survey. 
 
     
  
Copyright © Michael Vassalos 2013 
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Appendix 2: Mathematical Specification of the Economic Model for Chapter 4 
The grower’s objective is to maximize net returns above selected variable costs less the 
risk aversion coefficient multiplied by the variance of net returns and is given by: 
A. 1 	 	  
Subject to: land availability constraint, given by: 
A. 2 , , . 	 	 ⩝ 	 
Weekly labor resource limitation, given by: 
. 3 , , , , , , 	⩝  
Marketing balance: 
. 4 , , , , , , , 	 , , ,
	 , , , ,
0	 ⩝ , , , 	 
Input purchases by input: 
. 5 	 , , , , , 0		 ⩝  
Soil depth ratio constraint: 
. 6 " " , , ," " 	 " " , , ," "
0	 ⩝ , ,  
Crop rotation constraint: 
. 7 , , , 	 0.5	 	⩝  
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Contract choice given by: 
. 8 	 	 	1 
Either or constraints given by: 
. 9 	 , , ∗ , , 	 0, ∀	 , ,  
. 10 	 , , ∗ , , , ∀	 , ,  
Boolean logical constraints given by: 
. 11 	 , , 	 ∗ 	 0, ∀	 	 
. 12 	 , , 	 ∗ 	 0, ∀	 					 
Terminate contract disclaimer given by: 
. 13 , , ∗ 	 2, ∀	 				 
Balance requirement for contract volume 
. 14 	 , , 	 , , 	
	 , , 	 , ∗ 	
0	∀	 , ,  
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Net returns by year are given by:  
. 15 	 , , , , , , 	
, , 	 	
, , 	 0	 ⩝  
Contract Revenue given by: 
. 16 , , 	
	 , , ∗ , , ∀	 , ,  
Penalty Revenue given by: 
. 17 , , 	
, , ∗ , , ∀ , ,  
Expected profit balance is given by: 
. 18
1
	 0 
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Where, activities include: Coefficients include: Indices include: 
: Expected net returns above 
selected variable cost 
Φ: Risk aversion  
Coefficient 
C: Crop 
S: Soil depth 
, , , : Production of crop C, 
under transplanting/planting 
period D, harvesting period H 
and soil depth S 
, , : Weekly price for 
different tomato sizes in 
$/pound and for sweet corn in 
$ per ear 
TS: Tomato Size 
(medium, large, extra-
large). There is only one 
size for sweet corn. 
, : Purchases of input I 
: Net returns above selected 
variable cost by year 
, , , , : Expected yield 
of tomatoes by size in pounds 
and of sweet corn by ears 
H: Harvesting period (1 
for sweet corn) 
YR: Year 
, , , : Tomato sales 
by size (medium, large, extra-
large in pounds and sweet corn 
sales in dozens of ears by week 
and year respectively 
CONTRSALESCONTR,WK,YR: 
Large tomato sales requirement 
under contract by week and year 
when the volume requirements 
are met 
PENSALESCONTR,WK,YR: Large 
tomato sales under contract if 
volume requirements are not met, 
by week and year 
PICKCONTR, FAILCONTR,WK,PY, 
SATISFYCONTR,WK,PY: Binary 
integer decision variables 
: Available field 
days per week 
: Rotation matrix by 
crop C 
, , : Weekly price in 
$/pounds per tomato size and 
in $/ear for sweet corn 
" ": Ratio of total 
acres allocated to depth S 
CONTRPRICECONTR,WK: Price 
paid to the grower if the 
contract requirements are met 
by contract and week 
PENALTYPRICECONTR.WK: 
Price paid to the grower if a 
contract is selected and the 
volume requirements are not 
met 
M: A large number (Big M)
D: Transplant date for 
tomatoes, Planting date 
for sweet corn 
WK: Week 
I: Input 
N: State of Nature 
(13*38) 
CONTR: Contract 
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